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**Membership Categories:**  
- Regular: $50.00  
- Life membership: $400.00  
- Students: $30.00  
- Institutional: $500.00

For information about membership, change of address, registration for meetings, or back issues of SSA publications, please contact the Executive Director. Financial and other Donations: The SSA is legally incorporated as a non-profit making organization. Thus all contributions and other donations are tax exempt. Your gift is appreciated.

## Our Purpose

The Sudans Studies Association (SSA) is an independent professional society founded in the United States in 1981. Membership is open to scholars, teachers, students, and others with interest in the Sudans. The Association exists primarily to promote Sudanese studies and scholarship. It maintains a cooperative relationship with the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum and works collaboratively with the Sudan Studies Society of the UK. The SSA works to foster closer ties among scholars in the Sudan, North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other places. Normal activities of the SSA include the publication of this Bulletin, organizing meetings for the exchange of ideas, and recommending research candidates for affiliation with appropriate institutions of higher education in the Sudan. The Association also sponsors panels and programs during the meetings of other academic organizations. It occasionally publishes the proceedings of its annual meetings in book form. Learn more at http://www.sudanstudies.org/
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### Message from SSA Bulletin Editors

The editor, the members and leaders of the SSA wish to thank Dr. Bakry Elmedni of Long Island University in Brooklyn, New York not only for hosting the SSA conference in May 2016, at which most of these papers were presented, but also for volunteering to produce the 2016 issue of the Bulletin at his home university. Our collective gratitude is also extended to current president Dr. Anne Bartlett who together with Dr. Elmedni organized the conference. The annual SSA conferences continue to be a major source for the papers volunteered for publication in the Bulletin.

Special gratitude is also extended to Associate Editor Dr. Christopher Zambakari who issued a call for papers for this edition of the Bulletin, and to our Book Review editor doctoral candidate and Nubian linguist Marcus Jaeger of Cologne, Germany.

A collective expression of gratitude is extended to all of the contributors who volunteered their papers for publication in this issue. For thirty-five years of the existence of the Sudan Studies Association we have endeavored to encourage young Sudanists from every part of the globe, including the two Sudans to publish their work in the SSA Bulletin together with more senior scholars. It is worth repeating that in 2011, the year of the independence of South Sudan, the SSA reaffirmed its mission to provide a platform for reception and publication of scholarship of the two Sudans, Sudan and South Sudan. We especially welcome contributions from the two Sudans and from scholars outside the United States who we not often have the opportunity to meet except at international conferences co-organized by the SSA.

Unpublished manuscripts are welcomed, please submit to Christopher Zambakari or to the current editor
Under the theme “Twice the Challenge? Sudan, South Sudan and the Long Quest for Peace and Stability” the Sudan Studies Association convened its 35th annual conference at Long Island University in downtown Brooklyn. Scholars, independent researchers, practitioners, activists, and community members from near and far participated in a rich and diverse panels Friday May 27th through Sunday 29. Another unique feature of this year gathering was the Sudan’s Maps Exhibition organized and orchestrated by Dr. Richard Lobban. Some of the maps shown in this event date back to the 16th century.

On Friday, following greetings and welcoming remarks, Dr. David Deng, Research Director of South Sudan Law Society, who was our key note speaker, talked to the audience about the elusive search for justice in the Sudans. Aligning his remarks with the conference’s theme, Dr. Deng intellectually challenged the attendees and set the agenda for interesting and vigorous discussions to come. After a break, two concurrent panels followed the suit of the opening remarks: one focused on the Challenges facing Peace and Stability in Sudan and South Sudan, and the other discussed State-sponsored Violence and Bystanders. Keeping with the warm weather, the first day of our meetings concluded with two hot, though very engaging, panels: the first focused on displacement and new forms of governance in South Sudan and the second presented new archaeological developments in Meroe.

As we said our goodbyes, we already started thinking of our coming meeting in 2017 and I hope to see old faces as well as many new ones.

On Saturday, the second day, the content of presentations was equally engaging and intellectually challenging as the opening day. The concurrent morning panels addressed issues ranging from “Practices and Discourses of Rebellion and Counter-Insurgency in Sudan and South Sudan since 1800s” to “Gender, Culture and Language.” The late-morning panels brought many of the attendees together to listen to Dr. Abdullah Gallab’s analysis of the life of late Dr. al-Turabi in a presentation titled “The Collective Times of Hassan al-Turabi, the Man: From Hassan to Dr. Hassan to Sheik Hassan”. Others chose to attend the other panel on “External Engagement and Internal Adaptation: Histories of Sudan and its Neighbors.” The afternoon panels presented many attendees (myself included) with a conundrum of choice: should we stay in the big hall and watch the documentary (about everyday people and politics) titled “The Long Kiss” directed by Alexandra Sicotte-Levesque or should we go to the other room to listen to the needed discussion “On Constitutionalism.” There is no need to emphasize the importance of constitutionalism in places that cry for functional institutions, but you know you have a successful conference when you have to choose between two competing interests, and that is one of the positive outcomes of the tradeoffs conundrum. The closing of our second day was less of a conundrum and more of a mixed feelings of excitement and bafflement, for the panel was meant to honor a life time of distinguished scholarship of Dr. Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim. For decades, Dr. Ibrahim had compelled friends and foes to take positions regarding his intellectual and political contributions. Fortunately, all these threads of conversations continued as we gathered for our annual dinner at Brooklyn Sheraton. The perfect dessert and closing of an eventful day was the remarks given by Ahmed Gallab, the internationally famous singer-son of Souad Ali and Abdullahi Gallab “Sinkane” who spoke about his own journey, as son of immigrants, to discovering and engaging with contemporary Sudanese music.

Our last day, Sunday, started with less exciting news because we found out that all the panelists in the panel titled “the Role of Digital Communities in Building & Fortifying Arts and Cultural Relations between Sudanese and South Sudanese in Times of Disconnect and Polarization” would not be able to participate via Skype for technical reasons. The good news was that the other concurrent panel “Sudan Research and Ethics” led by Dr. Carolyn Fluehr- Lobban engaged attendees in the practical issues facing scholars and researchers who want to do research in Sudan and South Sudan. It was a beautiful, warm, and sunny afternoon when we concluded. It was time for us to say our goodbyes. Some of us were to drive a few hundred miles, many were to fly few thousand miles crossing oceans and seas, such as our German friends and supporters Margret Otto and Roman Deckert. As we said our goodbyes, we already started thinking of our coming meeting in 2017 and I hope to see old faces as well as many new ones.
An Elusive Search for Justice in the Sudans  
Keynote Speech for the SSA’ 35th Annual Conference

David K. Deng  
South Sudan Law Society

Shortly after the conflict in South Sudan broke out in December 2013, Thabo Mbeki and Mahmood Mamdani published an op-ed in the NY Times, entitled, “Courts Can’t End Civil Wars.” The op-ed counseled against the application of criminal law in relation to atrocities committed in South Sudan. The authors argued that efforts to hold individuals criminally accountable would remove the incentive for political leaders to participate in reforms. They went on to cite examples of countries, such as South Africa, in which the sidelining of criminal justice was said to be instrumental in ushering the countries through a difficult transition.

As much respect as I have for what these two men have accomplished in their lifetimes, I must admit that I was a bit surprised that they would use the example of South Sudan to make this point. Even a cursory examination of South Sudanese history would lead one to a more obvious conclusion that it is political accommodation that does not end wars. One need look no further than the CPA. To the extent that the issue of dealing with wartime abuses came up in the talks leading to the CPA, the two negotiating parties, the NCP and SPLM, quickly concluded that it was not in either of their interest to address it as part of the post-conflict transition. A vague provision about national reconciliation and healing was included in the text of the agreement, but it went entirely unimplemented in both north and south.

This points to a more fundamental weakness of the CPA was apparent in its failure to provide space for a historical accounting of the war and processes to promote south-south forgiveness and reconciliation. As a result, when the taps went dry with the shutdown of oil and the SPLM no longer had funds to fuel its patronage network, the historical animosities took over and we ended up with what we have today.

In fact, the CPA derailed what was fast becoming an organic and natural process of self-reflection among South Sudanese with the end of the war in 2005. The south-south dialogue was just beginning to gain steam and communities that stood on opposing sides of the political divide during the war were starting to come together to discuss how they might co-exist. In Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, for example, there was a meeting of the local Dinka and Fertit populations in Mapel in 2004. Throughout much of the civil war, the Dinka were seen to be aligned with the SPLA and the Fertit with the Sudan Armed Forces. At one point, tensions were so high that an imaginary line was drawn down the middle of Wau town that people from either community could not cross without putting their lives at risk. With the CPA coming and its promise of a long sought after respite from fighting, the Mapel conference provided an opportunity for the two communities to sit down and address their wartime grievances for the first time.

Alas, the promise of a process to address the past was not to be. After the signing of the CPA, the SPLM began discouraging these sorts of initiatives. The referendum on self-determination was all that mattered and the SPLM feared that opening these doors would unleash forces that they could not contain.

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armed youth protesters were shot. The state government then pursued a crackdown on the politicians that it said were behind the protests; of course, none of the uniformed men who killed the unarmed protesters were ever punished. More recently, since the December 2013 crisis, the very same political divides have been causing some people from the Fertit community to align themselves with SPLM-IO, which is behind much of the insecurity we’ve been seeing in and around Wau in recent months.

So, coming back to Mbeki and Mamdani’s prescription for peace, we’ve had nothing but political accommodation in the Sudans, yet the conflicts we see today are as bad as ever. Have the numerous blanket amnesties that have been offered in the past decade or so done anything to encourage combatants to engage in peace processes? Peter Gadet has defected and re-defected more times than I can count in his career as a warlord, as have many others like him. Isn’t there a danger that rather than giving an incentive to reform, rewarding those who wield violence to achieve their personal and political objectives instead incen-

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tivizes them to perpetrate more violence?

To the extent this is true, the place where it must be addressed is first and foremost in the context of the peace processes in which the rewards are doled out. The difficulty is that these processes focus on the actors who have blood on their hands, and to get them to commit to some sort of justice process presents additional complications to mediators who are already faced with an exceedingly difficult task in getting the parties to stop killing each other.

At least, this is what conventional wisdom tells us. In practice, the tension between peace and justice is often less pronounced. If one looks at the past two years of IGAD peace talks, for example, the degree to which the parties participated in the peace process was dictated more by military facts on the ground than by some vague threat of future accountability. Each step of the way, the logic that set peace and justice against one another proved to be based on faulty assumptions. When we were pushing for the AU Commission of Inquiry to release its report on abuses committed during the conflict, we were told, ‘If the AU publishes the report, the parties will walk away from the peace talks.’ When the report was finally released, it had zero impact on the parties’ participation in the talks. In fact, both sides made public statements wholeheartedly accepting the report. When some of us began advocating for justice and accountability to be addressed in the peace agreement, we were asked, ‘Why would the warring parties ever agree to a process that would be used against them?’ But they did. In August 2015, the parties signed a peace agreement that provided for a comprehensive transitional justice process, including a hybrid court, truth and reconciliation commission and reparations authority.

So I don’t see the tensions between peace and justice as a fundamental obstacle to efforts to address abuses in South Sudan. For these efforts to be successful, however, they must do more than simply not cause more violence. Experience from other countries shows that the success of efforts to address the past is directly correlated with the amount of local ownership and the degree to which the process is tailored to the local context. When it comes to securing local ownership, whether at the level of the political elite or in society more broadly, it is not so easy to sidestep the profound challenges that transitional justice poses in the South Sudanese context. While the warring parties have not officially opposed any aspect of the transitional justice program described in the peace agreement, aside from a Government reservation to the reparations component, we know that justice and accountability will raise thorny issues for the two principals and their supporters, and they will find it difficult to wholeheartedly endorse the program.

One thing that helps to reduce the political risk a bit is the fact that the transitional justice program will not be up and running over night. Even if we adhere to the timeframe in the peace agreement, which is very ambitious, we won’t have legislation for the institutions in place until October and from there it will take at least another year or two for the bodies to be up and running. In the case of the hybrid court, it must recruit staff, develop its internal rules of procedures and begin its investigations. By the time it’s ready to begin issuing indictments, we’ll already be near the end of the 30-month transitional period, if not into the post-transition under a newly elected government.

And in all likelihood, the hybrid court would not start with the most politically charged cases. A more sensible prosecutorial strategy would start with some of the lower hanging fruit and work its way up to more senior figures. We could be looking at 5 or 6 years before we see very politically sensitive trials. When viewed from this perspective, the political risk appears somewhat less problematic.

The more immediate task is to cultivate local demand and ownership among the people of South Sudan. This is where resources should be channeled in the short term. Transitional justice is a new concept in South Sudan. It will take a concerted effort to engage populations throughout the country in discussions about how best to build a collective narrative of South Sudan’s history of conflict, and how to approach justice and accountability in a context characterized by weak institutions and widespread abuses. Even in more peaceful times, the state and its international partners did not have an effective means of reaching that 80 percent of the population that resides in rural areas. In the politicized and tribalized
atmosphere of today’s South Sudan, public consultations on this issue will be all the more difficult.

Nonetheless, data from a number of recent surveys that we have conducted at the South Sudan Law Society suggest that efforts to promote transitional justice could find fertile ground in South Sudan. There is overwhelming support among populations in the country for holding people who are responsible for conflict-related abuses to account through criminal justice processes. And this is not just a normative position. People are not just saying that perpetrators should be held accountable because it’s the right thing to do. In fact, the most common rationale that people provide is deterrence; that holding people accountable is the only way to get them to stop killing civilians. There is also considerable opposition to amnesties. In another survey, 60 percent of the people we spoke to said perpetrators should not be offered amnesty and the opposition to amnesties was most pronounced in areas that were most directly exposed to conflict. This caught us by surprise as we had assumed that in the midst of an ongoing conflict people would prioritize whatever could help to stop the violence. Instead, what the findings demonstrate is the degree to which South Sudanese have recognized the perverse incentives of rewarding people for violence and their eagerness to try a different approach.

Despite the widespread interest in justice and accountabil-
ity, most South Sudanese are unaware of what the agreement proposes or what a transitional justice process would entail. Prior to the signing of the agreement in August 2015, 41 percent of the people we spoke to said they were not even aware of the ongoing IGAD peace process. The lack of awareness was particularly pronounced among women, 64 percent of whom were unaware of the process, compared to just 18 percent of men. These low levels of awareness with the IGAD process have translated into low levels of awareness with the agreement itself. In October 2015, a couple weeks after the agreement was signed, we found that 1 in 4 respondents in Wau and 1 in 6 in Juba were not even aware that an agreement had been signed. With respect to the transitional justice institutions in the peace agreement, two-thirds of respondents in Juba and three-quarters of respondents in Wau said they hadn’t heard of the hybrid court or the truth and reconciliation commission.

Acquainting people with the proposed institutions will be an important first step in implementing the agreement, but we also need to make sure that the institutions are designed in a way that makes sense in the South Sudanese context. This brings us to a second ingredient of local ownership, which concerns the extent to which the transitional justice program can build on and reinforce existing justice and reconciliation mechanisms, whether customary or statutory. This could be a whole topic of discussion in and of itself. We’ve seen processes elsewhere in which existing mechanisms have been adapted or incorporated into transitional processes with some degree of success. The gacaca courts in Rwanda are probably the most often cited example. When Rwanda found that it couldn’t hope to prosecute all its genocide suspects through the formal system, it drew inspiration from traditional mechanisms and established a network of 12,000 courts at the local level to address genocide cases. In little more than a decade, the gacaca courts adjudicated some 1.2 million genocide cases. Other successful collaborations between transitional justice and customary processes can be seen in the mato oput process in Northern Uganda or adat process in East Timor.

But South Sudan carries its own unique challenges. There is no lingua franca that is common to all South Sudanese. If you go to the state level, you can probably get by with Arabic, but at the payam and boma levels where the vast majority of the population lives, you’ll have to be conversant in the dozens of indigenous languages that people speak in South Sudan. This linguistic diversity mirrors a great wealth of cultural diversity as well. Every community has its own systems of customary laws and traditional authority, and the strength and legitimacy of these institutions vary across and within communities. Indeed, traditional authorities have been undermined by political and military interests for many years, and in certain parts of the country they have largely lost their ability to contain violent elements within their communities. Even before the December 2013 crisis, we were seeing inter-communal violence in places like Jonglei that involved acts of brutality every bit as bad as what we’re seeing in the current conflict. If traditional authorities were not able to contain that more localized violence, how can we expect them to address a conflict that is as overtly politicized as what we’ve seen since December 2013?

The formal justice system does not offer much of an alter-

These findings provide a glimpse into the inaccessibility of justice services in much of the country, even in times of relative peace
peace, it must find ways of strengthening existing institutions and building rule of law. This requires customary and statutory justice services that can address disputes before they rise to the level of violent conflict. To the extent that investments into transitional justice initiatives can be done in a way that reinforce existing mechanisms, they can contribute to this longer term goal.

I’d like to end with some thoughts about conceptual difficulties that arise with respect to transitional justice. A fundamental problem in this regard is what to do in the absence of a real transition. Complete breaks with past regimes in countries emerging from periods of conflict or authoritarian rule are far and few in between. In practice, what typically happens is that one side or the other wins outright, in which case those in control of the state are prone to pursuing a one-sided victor’s justice, or else the parties agree to some sort of consociation or power sharing arrangement and no one has any incentive to address past abuses. The notion of political continuity in those situations impedes prospects for the type of transformational change that transitional justice promises.

The continuity between the previous Sudanese administrations in southern Sudan and South Sudanese administration in the new republic has been apparent for many years and the peace agreement’s recreation of a pre-2013 government has done little to break with the past. A vivid example of the continuity among these regimes can be seen in the White House, the notorious military barracks at Giyada where people were disappeared in large numbers following the SPLA attack on Juba in 1992. Many of the southern Sudanese who tortured and killed people at the direction of Khartoum are still serving in government institutions to this day. Last year, we spoke to several people who had family members disappeared at the White House in the mid-90s who emphasized that the very same things are still going on today in South Sudan. As much as they want to see the truth of what happened to their loved ones back in the 1990s exposed and those responsible held to account, they don’t feel like they can speak out when the very same people still occupy positions of authority in the new government. Breaking these ties to repressive regimes of the past will be a central challenge for South Sudan for many years to come.

In many ways, the transition that South Sudan has embarked on with the signing of the August 2015 peace agreement is a transition in name only, in that it involves the same people who over the course of the past decade or so mismanaged the country and plunged it into the crisis with which we are now grappling. Nonetheless, the process has opened certain opportunities for reform. Academics, historians and researchers such as yourselves have a key role to play in this process. There is a strong tendency in emergency situations like those of South Sudan to take the path of least resistance and fall back on past modes of behavior that have proven themselves to be unsuccessful time and again. Transformative change cannot happen in the absence of innovation, and correcting the mistakes of the past so that they are not made again in the future. If we are able to change course, the tragedies and immense human suffering that the conflicts in the Sudans are posing may serve some purpose, in that they can put us on a trajectory towards dealing with the problems in our nations in a thoughtful and forward looking manner. In this sense, even incremental progress is something to celebrate and nurture so long as it is in the right direction and can be sustained.

I think I’ll stop there, thank you for listening.
1535, Lugini, Libyae Inte-rioris Pars, Tavula III, Affri, hand-painted polychrome. This Latin map covers northeast Africa from the Sinai to Cyrenaica (eastern Libya). Africa is not circum-navigable according to this Ptolemaic-style map. As a Claudius Ptolemeus map it follows the standard style from 47 to 64 degrees east of the Canary Islands. It has no scales but does have climate zones that “explained” cultural variation. Coastal sites can be reckoned such as Berenice (Benghazi), longitude 47, latitude 31, as well as a lake that is presumably Siwa Oasis (longitude 51 [looks like 41], latitude 30.5). Other interior tracks and mountain ranges are very approximate at best. Toponyms along the Nile can also be figured to correlate with modern places and, for example, Syene (Aswan) is located at longitude 62 and latitude 24.5. Directly east are Ichthyophagi (fish eaters), just north of another Berenice port on the Red Sea. Further south of 23 degrees latitude Roman knowledge trailed off. Nubia is literally off this map. (Ref. No 83001535). Image Dimension, W. 46 cm; H 29.5 cm.

1550, “Africa”, Sebastien Münster, unpainted German woodcut, published in his “Book of the World” Continental Africa is named by Münster (1489-1552) as the now circum-navigable continent in this new age of map printing. The Senega Flu is confused with the Nile that is not connected with the Nile as was sometimes believed. The Nile has the S-turn and the “island” of Meroe is shown as a true island. The Nile has three main tributaries, of which one arises from the Motes Lunae (Mountains of the Moon). The South Atlantic is termed the Ocean meridionalis. South of Cyrene (eastern Libya) is Libya interior and south of that is Aethiopia (“Land of the Burnt Faces”). Alexandria is shown properly in Egyptus. Regnum Mellili (the Empire of Male) is shown on the West African Coast. No longitudes or latitudes are provided, nor are there any dimensional scales. (Ref. No 82001550). Image Dimensions, W. 15.5 cm; H.12.5 cm.
Das sechste Buch der Weltbeschreibung durch Sebastianum Münster aus den erfunden Cosmographen und Historiographen zusammengestellte.


1655, *Haute Ethiopie ou sont l’Empire des Abissins, la Nubie, et le Zanguebar, by Sanson d’Abbeville, Geographer of the King, Paris.* Describing the region 32 degrees east, to 96 degrees east and 25 degrees north to 20 degrees south of the Equator. This nicely hand-painted polychrome has a highly detailed, but fanciful, interior of Africa. A confused Nubian River flows in from the southwest. Perhaps this was Wadi Howar? Two S-turns are shown for the main Nile, where there is but one. The Island of Meroe (Guergue) is shown as an island, although the Butana is not. But Meroe is indicated as a place. Further upstream the Nile divides into three, although it is only two. Lake “Zafrink” and Lake “Zembr” are combined somehow and “Lake” Zaflan sits by itself. This map is very lovely, but heavily fictitious and imaginative. (Ref. No. 83201665), Image Dimensions, W. 49.5 cm; H. 39.5 cm.

1760, “*Carta Geographica Dell’Etiopia o Abissinia.*” This finely detailed Italian map of a large quadrant of northeast Africa, the Near East and the Arab Peninsula offers exquisite facts, fiction and contemporary information and confusion about Africa in the mid-18th century. Close inspection is worthwhile. For example, details from the Kingdom of Tripoli (Libya today) previewed the American attack of the next decade to suppress the “Barbary pirates”. In the Kingdom (Regno) of Medra the oft-repeated and very wrong claim that the Niger (the Nile of the Negroes) might be the headwaters of the Nile. The Kingdom of Gorhan is noted for its strange language. The Kingdom of *Barbaria* is noted for its brutality, while the Desert of Berdoa has “great aridity” and its merchants (as in French maps) are known to be thieves, like the Kingdom of ElKanem. *Touti* and *Halfaia* are noted correctly at the confluence of the White and Blues Niles, long before there was Khartoum of Omdurman, but the White Nile is shown to curve off to the east where it disappears. In fact in goes southwest and into the Sudd swamps. There is, at this time, still no European direct awareness of the Great Lakes. The modern name “Sudan” is not present but only the Kingdoms of Nubia and Sennar, despite the fact that the last Christian kingdom had fallen in 1504. Across the Red Sea, the holy cities of Mecca and Medina can be seen as well as the Yemeni port town of Mocha from which our coffee get inspiration. To assist Mariners, there are three scales: in Turkish Miles and Maritime and French leagues calculated at 25 degrees latitude. (Ref: 82251760), Image Dimensions, W. 43 cm; H, 33 cm.

1770, *Nubia and Abissinia,* by Emanuel Bowen, delicate polychrome coloring with sharp yellow borders. This English language map closely followed the traditions and wording of Rigobert Bonne (1727-1795) who was himself, the official successor to J. N. Bellin as the Royal Cartographer in Paris. As the Enlightenment progressed, Bowen kept the florid decorative styles of Bellin and a diminished cartouche and compass rose are still present but there is even more detail. While shapes of geographical features are still rough, the Kingdoms of *Nubia of Sennar* and *Abissinia* (modern Ethiopia) have very numerous toponyms and various rivers flowing. Most of the main points of the 1760 Italian map above are repeated in this work of Bowen so perhaps it will easier to read them here in English. The S-curve in the Nile is getting resolved more realistically and the imaginative “Island of Meroe” is finally gone. The ‘wandering Ethiopians “Changgala are placed along the Blue Nile not far from the Falasha or fugitive Jews. (Ref. 82251770), Image Dimensions, W 42.5 cm; H cm.

1771, *Nubie et Abissinie,* by Rigobert Bonn, Bordeaux, XXX: A29. Rigobert Bonne (1727-1795) was a Hydrographic Engineer of the French Navy. Since the question of longitude was still not settled his meridian passes through Paris. He was the cartographer and engraver for his widely reputed *Atlas Maritime* (1762). This map expresses the honest ignorance of lands to the west and south of Nile by leaving them blank while earlier cartographers filled in with guesswork and colorful imagination. His larger maps usually have large, attractive and illustrative cartouches, but this rather straightforward on this map. It does, however, have four different referential scales. Since this is still the time of Ottoman rule of Egypt he refers to ‘Turkish Nubia’. The appellation ‘Sudan’ for this region is still a century or more away. The Bayouda desert is properly located. There is an interesting note above the scale that there are some mountains with emeralds and “Lac Gaoga” must be Wadi Howar. As with the map of Bowen he notes ‘Touti’ at the meeting of the White and Blue Niles. Strangely he has the Blue Nile zig-zagging toward Sennar and the White Nile is shown curving into Ethiopia. These are both important errors, while the ‘Kingdom of the Fungi’ with its capital at Sennar was still extant in 1771 it would be conquered by the Ottomans in 1821. (Ref. 82251771), Image Dimensions, W 41 cm; H 29.5 cm.
1792, *Carte de l’Egypt de la Nubie de l’Abissinie*, by Guillaume de l’Isle, Royal Academy of Sciences. Paris. Published in Amsterdam by Jean Covens and Corneille Mortier. This large atlas folio, is a colorful, comprehensive and detailed 1792 map of an extensive region of northeast Africa covers the Middle East (Levant) to a tiny part of the Gulf of Guinea north of the Equator. This map is so busy that one could study the late 18th century of many of the regions that are described or guessed at. Considering North Africa it covers the Barbary lands from Tunis across Libya to Egypt and the Red Sea. In the Fezzan (southern Libya) it notes that the desert of Berdoa is ‘very dry and filled with thieves’. Further south is the Kingdom of Bornou (in modern NE Nigeria and Chad). Many modern names of the major towns of Tunisia, and Libya are recognizable. The White Nile vanishes under some mountains known for their emeralds, while the Blue Nile descends accurately from Lake Dambea (modern Lake Tana) in Ethiopia. The map is provided with three scales in Turkish Miles, French marine leagues and French common leagues as a companion map on West Africa. (Ref. No. 82251792), Image Dimensions, W 58.5 cm; H 49 cm.

1798, “The World as Peopled by the Descendants of Noah, showing the countries possessed by Shem, Ham and Japhet and their posterity after the confusion of tongues”, Robert Wilkinson, London, 11 April. This remarkable hand-painted polychrome map of the entire Old World is quite accurate for the geographical shapes of the lands described, but as the title suggests it attempts to reconcile Old Testament Biblical genealogy with the known geography. This is almost century before the Berlin colonial partition and the discovery of Lake Victoria as a source of the White Nile and Wilkinson locates Nubia and Ethiopia quite nicely. In the Bible, the Dynasty XXV Nubian pharaohs: Shabaka (Sabtah), and Shabataka (Sabtecha) are noted as well as Taharka (Tirhaqeh) elsewhere. However, accurate it might be to have these three kings located in Nubia where they did rule, we have Sabtecha placed in the Congo (Angola really), and Sabtah in southern Ethiopia (at least closer). Dedan (the Nubian deity of Dewan) is located in Tanzania. Taharka got forgotten.

Although modern cartography is largely a product of the Enlightenment, there were such efforts to align modern maps with Biblical texts and history. Certainly many parts of the Bible can be reconciled with history and geography, but the tri-partite racial structure (of the three sons of Noah) of the world according to the Bible is not adequate to address this complex and evolving racial taxonomy. Japeth is reputed to be the ancestor of Europeans, Shem the ancestor of Asians, while Ham is the ancestor of Africans. Focusing just on Ham (Khem) his descendants (in the lower left corner), we have Cush (Nubians/Sudanese), Mizriam (Egyptians) and Canaanites (of the Near East. (Ref: 82001798), Image dimensions, W 43.5 cms; H 28.5 cms.

1844, *Neueste Karte von Nubien, Habesch, Kordofan und Darfur*. Meyers Handatlas, number 48, Bibliographischen Institute zu Hildburghausen. This finely detailed regional map from the German cartographers benefiting from German travelers and other explorers still before the Berlin partition. It is really amazing in its refinement and precision for this region and its contemporary polities noted in the title. The White Nile heads upstream in the right direction even though it is still not known where its Great Lakes headwaters are located. The *Insel Meroe* is located in the Butana at last. Cities, towns and villages along the Nile are all reckoned in tiny but accurate fonts. Darfur, Kordofan, Dar Sennar and Habesch all have suggested sovereignty, as well as desert tracks and many ethnic groups of the time and place. Precision is also guaranteed by twelve different scales in the region between latitudes 8 to 24 degrees north and longitudes 23 to 43 east of the Prime Meridian. For those studying mid-19th century Sudan this map is a treasure house of precise information with a magnifying lens in hand. (Ref 82251844), Image Dimensions, W 35.5 cm; H 29.5 cm.
1851, *Carte de l’Egypte, de la Nubie, de l’Abissinie, du Kourdofan et d’une partie de l’Arabie*, by Col. M. Lapie et fils, Paris. This is similar in detail to the German map above, but it covers a larger region so more is seen but in a bit less detail. The map covers latitudes 7 to 32 degrees north and longitudes 25 to 41 degrees east. In has four scales and considerable detail for long distance caravan routes traversing the region before road, rail and air. The White Nile basically disappears in Dar Shilluk, but the lowermost left corner notation is still thinking about the Mountains of the Moon. In a few more decades, at Fashoda, not yet noted, in their famous quarrel with the English in 1898 about who will control/claim the headwaters of the White Nile. Lower and Upper Nubia (northern Sudan) are well known for century so there is not much new, but all is quite precise. In a very tiny font there is a note about ‘Gamusie’ or ‘Emdurman’ that will become the Mahdist capitol of Omdurman three decades later. Cobbé is indicated as the capitol of Darfur, while *Ibeit or Obeit* is the capitol of Kordofan. Swamps noted by Ptolemy are found on the western edge of the map and are no doubt Lake Gaoga/Wadi Howar; is this an indication of the long-term desertification of the Sahara? *(Ref 82251851), Image Dimensions, W 39.5 cm; H 55 cm.*

1860, *Das Nordostliche Africa*, with contributions from Franz G. LeJean, the German Consul in Massawa. With rapid progress and sharing in the mapping of Africa by the 19th century this German map is rich in detail, especially in coastal towns and promontory points on the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa. After awaiting centuries for Europeans to find the source of the White Nile in Victoria Njansa/UkereweSee, it was now known and is pretty well indicated in this early effort, but precisely where it exited was still very blurry. However, look carefully, and Gondokoro is indicated as the southernmost outpost of the Turco-Egyptian colony of Sudan. Trans-Saharan caravan routes are clear and by this time, the Sultanate of Darfur was twice the size of Kordofan. Ethnonyms and topography of the region are also rich in this map. Two scales are provided in German and English miles for the vast area covering from latitudes 5 degrees south to 40 degrees north, and from longitudes 14 degrees to about 75 degrees east Only decades away from the Berlin partition of Africa, the legend in the upper right corner indicates Turkish and French interests that would soon be challenged as well as routes of European explorers from 1701 to 1860 when the map was drawn. Take your time and use a hand lens to fully enjoy perusing this map. *(Ref 82251860), Image Dimensions, W 51 cm; H 63.5 cm.*

1875, *Carte de L’Afrique Septentrionale*, by Adrien Hubert Brué, hand-painted polychrome from his *Atlas Universel* in 67 leaves; this is map number 36. *Institut Géographique, Paris.* This highly detailed, really extraordinary, map of northern (*septentrionale*) Africa is both precolonial so without the colonial borders but with the many names of African ethnic groups and independent polities (like Wadai and Darfur), and it shows the tracks and tracks of eleven European explorers as the knowledge of Africa was being accumulated after the Enlightenment and in the Age of Exploration. American military cartographers and explorers, working for the Turks after the US Civil War, were probably also consulted by this time. Thus this context makes this map very interesting.

For *Nubie* (Sudan) the course of the White Nile is, at last, correct and since Lake Victoria/Nyanza had been discovered by Burton and Speke it is also in the right place. The Isle d Meroe is also shown correctly as being the Butana on the other side of the Bayouda desert. The problematic Lake Gaoga is gone (perhaps also is Wadi Howar) and Khartoum is now indicated. Southern ethnic groups and the many rivers draining into the Sudd are also shown with accuracy. A substantial and very detailed inset in the upper right corner for *Abysinia* is another feature of this remarkable French map. Central Africa was still much unexplored so this is largely, and honestly, left blank. *(Ref 82001875); Image Dimensions, W 51 cm; H 36 cm.*
1887, *Map Illustrating The Journeys of Dr. W. Junker between the Upper Nile and the Congo, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, London*. With Turkish and English colonialism present in Sudan for some six decades, this 1887 map of the southern Sudan offers rich and focused detail of the region that would become so very contentious in the coming century as well. Besides the general understanding of regional geography, this map was heavily reliant on the travels of Junker and Bohndorff. The map covers the region from Fashoda, to be contested by the French and British in 1898 in the Fashoda incident, all the way to the Mobangi and Uptoto rivers that flow west into the Congo and the northeast corner of Victoria Nyanza as well as lakes Albert, Mutu Nzige and Kioga, discovered by American Col. Charles Chaille-Long. General Gordon of Khartoum had just been killed in 1885 in the Mahdist uprising. Points of later importance, such as Redjaf and Lado in Bari country are noted near to Gondkoro. The pioneering nature of this map is seen in the small italicized notes that suggest places might not be where guessed and distances are rendered in so many days march as reported by “Rafa’s people”. Anthropologists focused on ethnogenesis and migration will be tempted by the location of southern ethnonyms. (Ref 86301887.1), Image Dimensions, W 53.5 cm; H 37.5 cm.

1904, *Afrika: Ost Sahara*, BL 2, Stieler's Hand-Atlas, Number 70, Beirbeit von C. Barich, Gotha: Justus Perthes. During the period between 1885 and 1917 the Germans held sway in Togo, Kameroun, Tanganyika and Southwest Africa, while none of these colonies are on this map, the German interest in Africa was very high. Since this map covers a very large area from 12 to 42 degrees east longitude and from 13 to 34 north latitude there are many comments that could be made. While the borders of Lower and Upper Egypt are defined reaching to Wadi Halfa. ‘Nubien’ is indicated as the adjacent country although in the same size font is glossed with ‘Engl. Agyptischen Sudan’ So promptly after the Anglo-Egyptian conquest, the nomenclature was starting to shift. At the same time, northwestern Sudan seems to be under no one’s territory with a vague dotted line given a rough idea of something. Darfur, still not conquered until 1916 has a reference to Dar Tokona. Neighboring Eritrea is already shown as a separate [Italian] colony, but its separation under Eritrean authority still awaits until 1991. Clearly, much was in transition as this cartographic snapshot well attests. There is but one scale, in English miles; 1:7,500,000. (Ref 82251904), Image Dimensions, W 44 cm; H 35 cm.
DIGLOSSIA: SUDANESE AND EGYPTIAN DIALECTS COMPARED TO STANDARD ARABIC
Grammatical Negation in Cairene, Sudanese And Modern Standard Arabic

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Arizona State University

Abstract
This study compares negative tense construction in three varieties of Arabic: Cairene, Sudanese, and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) with respect to future, present, and past tenses. The result of the analysis has demonstrated that the distinction in tense marking between the three varieties is a surface difference as the affirmative examples have illustrated. Differences between the three varieties are found in the negatives where in MSA tense is lexicalized with negation, whereas in Cairene and Sudanese it stays with the verb confirming the hypothesis suggested by this analysis. The negation of pronouns in the three varieties reflects major differences between them. Cairene negative pronouns -- that are formed by attaching the discontinuous negative morpheme ma-š around the pronoun -- are unique and have no identical equivalent in Sudanese or MSA. All pronouns in Sudanese are negated by adding the prefix maa while the pronouns themselves undergo no changes. In MSA the negative form laysa plays a similar role in negating Standard pronouns that equally remain consistently unchanged. However, the major distinction resides in the fact that the negative form laysa goes through a major conjugation process with each single pronoun.

The aim of this study is twofold: first to show that negative tense construction in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), Cairene, and Sudanese Arabic displays features of similarities as well as differences. Secondly, the paper reflects on negative pronouns in Cairene as compared to the negation system of pronouns in Sudanese and Modern Standard Arabic, respectively. The first part of the paper focuses on comparing the negation system in these three varieties of Arabic with respect to future, present, and past tenses. The paper suggests that the distinction in tense marking between the three varieties is a surface difference. Affirmative sentences, on which the negation will be based in the data below, indicate that the past forms are identical in that all three varieties use the perfect form of the verb. As the analysis will show, in comparing the future tense, for instance, all varieties also use a prefix with an imperfect form of the verb. The difference seems to reside in the phonetic realization of that prefix. The same applies to the present tense where Modern Standard Arabic seems to have no present tense marker while both Cairene and Sudanese do have ones. More differences between the three varieties appear in the negatives where in MSA tense is lexicalized with negation, whereas in Cairene and Sudanese it stays with the verb.

The second part of the paper deals with the interesting case of negative pronouns in Egyptian Arabic. Based on a study conducted by Mushira Eid (1991), the paper discusses the function of negative pronouns in Cairene Arabic with respect to four properties exhibited by these pronouns including the following: the fact that they take the discontinuous negative morpheme ma-š, rather than miš, has been perceived as evidence for their verb-like function. Secondly, the negative pronouns are not nominals, not arguments, in that they cannot be used to answer wh- questions, but can be used to answer yes/no questions. The third property is that pro-drop (please explain) is not possible in verbless sentences except in those that include a negative pronoun. And finally, negative pronouns are used with non-referential predicates such as locative/prepositional predicates; indefinite adjective phrases; and indefinite nouns phrases. However, negative pronouns cannot be used in sentences with an unambiguous identity reading, only the negative miš can be used in this context. Egyptian negative pronouns apparently have a unique function that does not seem to have an identical counterpart neither in Sudanese nor in Modern Standard Arabic. The pronoun in Sudanese and MSA, respectively, is negated differently as will also be briefly shown.

The examples presented in the following data are based on Cairene, Sudanese, and Modern Standard Arabic. Each of the three categories reflects aspects of the grammatical negation system with respect to present, future, and past tenses in their respective vernaculars. Before delving into discussing the data, it might be worth noting (as far as the Sudanese data is concerned) that it is very difficult to speak of one Sudanese dialect in general because of the fact that many diverse Sudanese vernaculars exist depending on what region of the country one comes from. Although Arabic is the mother tongue of the vast majority of Sudanese, there isn’t one single dialect used by all native speakers of Arabic in the Sudan. Given this, by ‘Sudanese dialect’ or ‘Sudanese’ in this paper, I refer to the language spoken by the Sudanese of the metropolitan capital city Khartoum and its suburbs.

The first set of data below presents affirmative sentences in Cairene, Sudanese, and Modern Standard Arabic followed by a data displaying the negation of past, present, and future tenses (in addition to one verbless example) in these sentences.
### Affirmative Sentences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cairene</th>
<th>Sudanese</th>
<th>MSA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xalid latiif</td>
<td>Xalid latiif</td>
<td>Xalid latiifun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد لطيف</td>
<td>خالد لطيف</td>
<td>خالد لطيف</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Khalid is nice)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xalid ha-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Xalid ha-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Xalid sa-ya-ktub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد حيكتب</td>
<td>خالد حيكتب</td>
<td>خالد سيكتب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Khalid will write)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xalid bi-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Xalid bi-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Ø-ya-ktub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد بيكتب</td>
<td>خالد بيكتب</td>
<td>يكتب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Khalid writes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xalid katab</td>
<td>Xalid katab</td>
<td>kataba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد كتب</td>
<td>خالد كتب</td>
<td>خالد كتب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Khalid wrote)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Negation of Present, Future, and Past Tenses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Egyptian</th>
<th>Sudanese</th>
<th>MSA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1a) Xalid miš latiif</td>
<td>Xalid maa latiif</td>
<td>Xalid laysa latiifan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد مش لطيف</td>
<td>خالد ما لطيف</td>
<td>خالد ليس لطيفا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(is not nice)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1b) Xalid ma-huvwašaš latif</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد ما هوّاش لطيف</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Xalid miš ha-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Xalid maa ha-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Xalid lan yaktub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد مش حيكتب</td>
<td>خالد ما حيكتب</td>
<td>خالد لن يكتب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(will not write)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3a) Xalid miš bi-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Xalid maa bi-yi-ktib</td>
<td>Xalid laa yaktub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد مش بيكتب</td>
<td>خالد ما بيكتب</td>
<td>خالد لا يكتب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(does not write)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3b) Xalid ma-b-yi-ktib-š</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد ما بيكتبش</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Xalid ma-katab-š</td>
<td>Xalid maa katab</td>
<td>Xalid lam yaktub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد ما كتبش</td>
<td>خالد ما كتب</td>
<td>خالد لم يكتب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(did not write)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparing these categories reveals quite an interesting analysis. The Egyptian category, for instance, is based on the fact that the negative morpheme in Egyptian Arabic has two forms: a ‘free’ form and a discontinuous form. The first is miš, which is unrestricted as to the type of constituent it can occur with. The second discontinuous form is ma-š, which occurs only with verbs. On the other hand, only the ‘free’ form of the negative miš can occur with nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositional phrases with nominal NP objects all of which the discontinuous negative ma-š cannot occur with (Eid 1983: 199). Thus, in example (1a) of the Egyptian data above, Xalid miš latif, the negative miš occurs between the subject and the predicate. However, when the other form of the negative ma-š is used, a pronoun agreeing with the subject in gender, number, and person occurs in that same position carrying the discontinuous negative. For instance, in examples (1b), Xalid mahuwwaa-š latif, where Xalid is the subject, the pronoun that appears with the discontinuous negative ma-š is in agreement with the subject in gender, person and number. When comparing example (1b) with (1a) where the ‘free’ negative miš is used, we notice that the difference between the (1a) and (1b) versions in these two examples resides in the presence in (1b) only of a pronoun occurring between the subject and the predicate and carrying the discontinuous negative ma-š. In Eid’s useful analysis, this pronoun -- which also agrees in gender, number, and person with the subject of the person -- functions as a copula, indeed like other copulas and verbs in that it carries the discontinuous negative ma-š, which is carried only by copulas and verbs. This further confirms Eid’s argument that in Egyptian Arabic equational sentences where no present tense copula exists in the language, pronouns behave syntactically like verbs. In certain instances, these pronouns occur in verb position carrying the discontinuous negative ma-š that is normally carried by verbs and copulas.

If we compare the Sudanese version of (1a) Xalid maa latif, we notice that it is almost identical to its counterpart of the Egyptian version (1a) Xalid miš latif. The only difference is that the Sudanese negative form maa replaces the Egyptian negative form miš. The rest of the analysis remains as it is. However, the other version of the Egyptian (1b) Xalid mahuwwaa-š latif seems to be non-existent in the Sudanese dialect dealt with in this paper. With regard to the Modern Standard Arabic version of (1a) Xalid laysa latifian, we also observe that the standard negative form laysa also occurs between the subject and predicate. It can be argued that laysa can be analyzed as a type of ‘verb’ on the basis of its case-assignment properties. Like kaana, ‘was,’ laysa assigns accusative to the predicate, as in latifian. In Classical and Modern Standard Arabic laysa is used to denote negation with both nominal and verbal sentences. As Zia Ul-Haq (1984) maintains, in “both cases, it shows the negation in the present unless modified by contextual elements for the past or future”. Thus, within the context of a verbal sentence, laysa acts as the negation of kaana, a substantive verb that expresses the idea of being or existence in the past. Another possible analysis in this respect is that “laysa can be analyzed like the negative pronouns that behave like copula in Egyptian and other dialects”.

Regarding the negation of the future tense, as in example (2), we notice that in the Egyptian category, Xalid miš ha-yiktib, a prefix is used with the imperfect form of the verb. Yet, perhaps the most important analysis in this respect is that the negative form miš is obligatory with verbs in the future tense (as it is obligatory with verbs in the present tense that will also be explained within the course of this paper). The same applies to the Sudanese category of this version, Xalid maa ha-yiktib, which is again almost identical in its analysis with its Egyptian counterpart with the exception of the replacement of the Egyptian negative form miš with the Sudanese maa. In the Modern Standard Arabic version of (2a), Xalid lan yaktub, the future is similarly negated by using the negative prefix lan with the imperfect form of the verb; the negative morpheme lan signifies a future tense negation that requires dropping the future morpheme sa. In addition to this, perhaps the difference in future tense-marking between Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian, and Sudanese dialects lies just in the phonetic realization of the negation prefix.

It might also be useful to mention that in Modern Standard Arabic, the future particle sawfa may be made negative by the use of the negative form laa immediately before the imperfect verb particularly, as Dilworth Parkinson (2003) has noted, in journalistic Arabic (i.e. sawfa laa). However, if the prefix sa is used, no negative is possible. In a recent study, and after researching a corpus that included an entire year of the al-Ahram newspaper, and an entire year of al-Hayat newspaper, Parkinson has concluded that: “while in fact people do occasionally use sawfa laa, when they come to overtly mark a future negative they almost always go with lan”. The following table from the Parkinson study shows the sharp discrepancy between the use of lan as opposed to sawfa laa in al-Ahram and al-Hayat newspapers for the period mentioned above. The table shows that: “although sawfa laa is a minor phenomenon in both papers, it is still used about twice as often in the Ahram as it is in the Hayat.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>lan</th>
<th>sawfa laa</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahram</td>
<td>10268 (99.4%)</td>
<td>67 (.06%)</td>
<td>10335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayat</td>
<td>12270 (99.7%)</td>
<td>33 (.03%)</td>
<td>12303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>22538</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning now to examine the negation of the present tense in the three varieties of Arabic in question, we notice that the Egyptian examples of (3a) and (3b) of the data above: Xalid miš bi-yi-ktib, Xalid ma-b-yi-ktib-š, respectively, indicate that with verbs in the present tense either form of the negative can be used. As is the case with the future tense, a prefix is used with the imperfect form of the verb. And as mentioned earlier, the negative form miš is obligatory with verbs in the present tense as in (3a) Xalid miš bi-yi-ktib. However, what is very interesting with regard to the negation of the present tense in Cairene Arabic is that the discontinuous negative ma-š can also be used as in (3b) Xalid ma-b-yi-ktib-š. Thus, while sentential negation in Egyptian Arabic takes one of two forms: miš and ma-š, generally speaking, in verbal sentences, the choice between them seems to depend in some way on the tense/aspect configuration associated with the verb. Hence, in the present tense both negative forms may be used.

Although the discontinuous negative ma-š seems to have no equivalent in the Sudanese dialect, in comparing the Sudanese Cairene version of (3a) Xalid maa bi-yi-ktib, we notice that it is again almost identical to the Cairene version of the same example (3a) Xalid miš bi-yi-ktib and, thus, the same analysis is true of the negation of the present tense for the Sudanese version of this example. In this case, both Cairene and Sudanese have a prefix bi, but the tense is not lexicalized with the negation and remains with the verb. Yet, example (3b) has shown the interesting analysis that Cairene also allows
the other negative form ma-š to be used with the present tense, as in Xalid ma-b-yi-ktrib-š. If we turn now to the Modern Standard Arabic version of (3a), Xalid laa yaktub, we observe that the negative morpheme laa is obligatory with verbs in the present tense as illustrated by example (3a). However, in comparing this MSA version with the function of the present tense in Egyptian and Sudanese illustrated by (3a), it becomes clear that in Modern Standard Arabic tense is lexicalized with negation, while in Cairene and Sudanese it stays with the verb. Another difference resides in the phonetic realization of the prefix in the three varieties. Yet, while Cairene and Sudanese each has a prefix bi-, Standard Arabic has no phonetic realization. Alternatively, it can be concluded that Standard Arabic has no present tense marker whereas both Cairene and Sudanese have.

Example (4) illustrates the grammatical negation of the past tense in the three varieties of Cairene, Sudanese, and Standard Arabic, respectively. The first Cairene example, Xalid ma-katab-š, shows that the Egyptian discontinuous negative ma-š is obligatory with past tense verbs. In comparison with all previously discussed tense negation of Cairene, the negation of the past tense is unique in terms of the fact that it uses the perfect form of the verb, as in ma-katab-š. The Sudanese version of example (4) of past tense nega-
tion interestingly also uses the perfect form of the verb, yet it does not use the last part of the Egyptian discontinuous negative – š, thus, Xalid maa katab as opposed to the Cairene Xalid ma-katab-š. It is, however, the Modern Standard Arabic version of example (4), Xalid lam yaktub, which remains consistently identical to the negation of the future and present tenses in the same MSA category where a prefix with the imperfect form of the verb is used as illustrated above. The basic idea here is that the negative form lam followed by the imperfect form of the verb usually denotes negation in the simple past tense as in the example above, Xalid lam yaktub (Khalid did not write).

Negative Pronouns in Cairene Arabic

In the second part of this paper, I reflect on the interesting function of negative pronouns in Cairene Arabic, an apparently unique task that does not seem to have an identical counterpart neither in Sudanese nor in Modern Standard Arabic. The pronoun in Sudanese and MSA, respectively, is negated differently as will also be shown.

In her article, “Verbless Sentences in Arabic and Hebrew”, Mushira Eid discusses the set of ‘negative pronouns’ in Cairene Arabic that corresponds to all the pronouns of the language. She explains that these pronouns are formed by attaching the discontinuous negative morpheme ma-š around the pronoun. This process includes other phonological changes affecting vowel length and/or deletion. Eid provides a list of these pronouns and their negative counterparts shown below in Table 2:

Table 2 (Cairene Negative Pronouns: The Eid Study)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pronoun</th>
<th>Negative Pronoun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘I’</td>
<td>ana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I am not.’</td>
<td>man-š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘We’</td>
<td>ihna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘We are not.’</td>
<td>ma-hnna-š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘You (MS)’</td>
<td>inta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘You (MS) are not.’</td>
<td>ma-ntaa-š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘You (FS)’</td>
<td>inti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘You (FS) are not.’</td>
<td>ma-ntii-š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘You (PL)’</td>
<td>intu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘You (PL) are not.’</td>
<td>ma-ntuu-š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘He’</td>
<td>huwwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘He is not.’</td>
<td>ma-huwwaa-š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘She’</td>
<td>hiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘She is not.’</td>
<td>ma-hiyyaa-š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘They’</td>
<td>humma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘They are not.’</td>
<td>ma-humma-š</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eid discusses four fascinating properties exhibited by these negative pronouns: The fact that they take the discontinuous negative morpheme ma-š, rather than the ‘free’ negative morpheme miš, has been taken as evidence for their verb-like function since the discontinuous morpheme ma-š goes typically with verbs. The second interesting property is that these negative pronouns are not nominals in that they cannot be used to answer a wh- (unclear, wh-?) question, whereas they can be used to answer yes/no questions. The fact that negative pronouns can appropriately be used to answer yes/no questions is perceived as evidence that these pronouns are nominals and, thus, cannot be used as arguments. The third intriguing property illustrated by Eid is that, pro-drop is not possible in verbless sentences except in those that include a negative pronoun. Example (39a, b) of the Eid study illustrates that, when the negative pronoun is used, the subject pronoun becomes optional. However, when only the negative morpheme miš is used, the pronoun must appear, just as it does in affirmative sentences. The last and fourth property exhibited by negative pronouns is that they are used with non-referential predicates as in example (40) of the Eid study where they are used with a locative/prepositional predicate as in ‘Ali ma-huwwa-š hina (‘Ali is not here); with indefinite adjective phrase as in, Nadia ma-hiyyaa-š šatra (Nadia is not smart); and with an indefinite noun phrase as in (ihna) ma-hnna-š mudarris-inn (we are not teachers). However, Eid elucidates that the negative pronouns cannot be used in sentences with an unambiguous identity reading such as (*ana ma-ni-š), a context in which only the negative miš is used as in (ana miš ana). The author further draws an interesting portrait between these two contrasts. For the purpose of comparing Egyptian negative pronouns with the negation system of pronouns in Sudanese and Modern Standard Arabic, the following two sets of data have been adopted:

---

The table above shows the negative pronouns in Cairene Arabic and their negative counterparts. The pronouns are listed under their personal case forms, followed by their negative counterparts. The last column indicates the English translation of each pronoun. The table includes examples of how these pronouns are used in sentences to express negation.

Eid’s discussion of these pronouns highlights their unique properties in Cairene Arabic, distinguishing them from other negative forms like miš. The table provides a clear overview of the pronouns and their usage, which can be useful for understanding the grammatical structure of Cairene Arabic.
Since I have not focused extensively on the subject of Sudanese negation of pronouns, I will just briefly compare the data from the Eid study (Table 2) on Cairene negative pronouns with what appears to be the Sudanese system of negating pronouns illustrated by the data above. Reading through Table (3), we immediately notice that the system of Cairene negative pronouns seems to have no equivalent in Sudanese. As the data on Sudanese pronouns shows, all pronouns are negated by simply adding the prefix maa, yet the pronoun itself does not change and stays as it is. If we turned now to the negation of pronouns in Modern Standard Arabic, we find out that Standard pronouns can mostly be negated by using the negative prefix laysa that becomes conjugated with each single pronoun just as kaana does. On the other hand, the pronouns themselves stay as they are and do not undergo any change, as has been the case with Sudanese pronouns. This latter aspect of negation that is shared by Sudanese and MSA is sharply contrasted with the unique function of Egyptian negative pronouns that are formed by attaching the discontinuous negative morpheme maš around the pronoun. Thus, the distinction is that: while a process that includes such phonological changes as affecting vowel length (and perhaps other aspects) occurs with negative pronouns in Egyptian, the negated pronouns in both Sudanese and Modern Standard Arabic remain consistently unchanged.

**Conclusion**

In the first part of this paper, I compared the negative tense construction in three varieties of Arabic: Cairene, Sudanese, and Standard with respect to future, present, and past tenses. The analysis has shown that the distinction in tense marking between the three varieties is a surface difference. The affirmative examples have demonstrated that all three varieties use the perfect for the verb. The comparison of the future also seemed to be the same in that all varieties use a prefix with an imperfect form of the verb. The analysis has also indicated that the distinction lies in the phonetic realization of that prefix. The same is true of the present tense where Modern Standard has no present tense marker while both Cairene and Sudanese do have ones. Differences between the three varieties are found in the negatives where in MSA tense is lexicalized with negation, whereas in Cairene and Sudanese it stays with the verb confirming the hypothesis suggested at the beginning of this paper. The analysis provided in the second part of the paper has shown that the three varieties of Arabic discussed have major differences regarding the negation of pronouns. Negative pronouns in Egyptian Arabic are formed by attaching the discontinuous nega-
tive morpheme ma-š around the pronoun, a process that includes other phonological changes affecting vowel length as the discussion above has shown. The paper has also reflected on the Eid study of the four properties exhibited by these negative pronouns that can be summarized as follows: the fact that they take the discontinuous negative morpheme ma-š, rather than miš, has been perceived as evidence for their verb-like function. Secondly, the negative pronouns are not nominals, i.e. not arguments, in that they cannot be used to answer wh- questions, but can be used to answer yes/no questions. The third property is that pro-drop is not possible in verbless sentences except in those that include a negative pronoun. And fourth, negative pronouns are used with non-referential predicates such as locative/prepositional predicates; indefinite adjective phrases; and indefinite nouns phrases. However, negative pronouns cannot be used in sentences with an unambiguous identity reading, only the negative miš is used in this context. On the other hand, the analysis has shown that the system of Cairene negative pronouns has no identical equivalent in Sudanese or in Modern Standard Arabic. As the data on Sudanese pronouns has indicated, all pronouns in Sudanese are negated by adding the prefix maa while the pronoun itself undertake no changes. The analysis has also indicated that the Standard negative form laysa plays a major role in negating Standard pronouns. However, what is distinctive in this respect is that while laysa goes through a major conjugation process with each single pronoun just as kaana does, the pronouns themselves remain consistently unchanged.

REFERENCES


1. Nobii versus English

Nobii (*2) is an African indigenous language, whose native speakers “Nob-ii” dwell in the historical region “Nubia” along the Nile River between Sudan and Egypt. Nobii as a language belongs to the Nilo-Saharan phylum(*3). Within this phylum it belongs to the Northern East Sudanic family, then subordinate to the sub-family Nubian. It is akin to Old Nubian, the language of Christian Nubia and to the Nubian family of languages (*4). Some linguist consider the Old Nubian as an archaic form of Nobii (*5). During the Christian Nubian (*4) era, Old Nubian was a formal language in the Nubian Christian kingdoms. It was inscribed in the so-called Coptic-Creek alphabets with some domestic modifications in both calligraphy and orthography appeared in the ancient Nubian scripture, which distinct conspicuously the Old Nubian corpus contents from the other Coptic ones. The Old Nubian writing diminished sometime after the collapse of Dongola in 1323 A.D. Although some historical sources dated the existence of Nobii to at least 2,500 years old (*6), the fact so far is known that Nobii is an extant language for about 1,600 years since the arising of the Nubian Kingdom Nobatia in 350 A.D. In the current time, Nobii is under great threat of extinction as multitudes of young Nobii-generations lose their attachment to their language due to forcible and arbitrary migrations from their motherland.

Unlike Nobii, the history of English language shows a very successful path since its old age until today. During the Renaissance age, English flourished through the extensive poetic writings and literary texts. Then through colonialism, English was prevailed in the British colonies world-wide and nowadays it is considered the most dominant international language, which is used globally in science, in technology, in international trade, in global investments, in the stock markets, in the international media, and the world of arts and literature.

This paper exhibits a literary comparison between two distinct cultures; the Anglo-Saxon European culture and the African Nubian culture through translating one of the greatest English poetic works written at the beginning of the language golden age. It is actually a poetic dialogue between two languages; one symbolizes the lingual supremacy of the White European culture, while the other one represents the voice of an entombed ancient black civilization which only exists nowadays in our world at the museums and inside the history and archeology books. The paper holds a challenging question, whether this poetic dialogue is possible in spite of the economical, the political, and the post-colonial barriers.

2. The Petrarchan Sonnet

Francesco Petrarch, who was also known as “the father of humanism”(*7), was an Italian scholar and a poet prior to the Renaissance (*8). Petrarch wrote poetry in the Latin language(*9). Nevertheless, the most significant literary works of his was in Italian, which was a vernacular language (*10) in his time. His intelligent works “The Sonnets” (a set of love poems) inspired many European poets who translated them into their own vernacular languages. The Petrarchan sonnet, during the Renaissance age, became the model of European lyric poetry and it was composed in a rhymed form and homogeneous musicality(*11).

At the time of Renaissance, poetry and drama were the dominant types of literary forms in the English literature (*12). Different forms of English poetry were experienced by English poets such as; the lyric, the contemplative poem, the elegy, and the pastoral poem. The Petrarchan sonnet was introduced to the English literary world by Thomas Wyatts (*13), Henry Howard, and Earl of Surrey, who collectively managed to translate the literary works of Francesco Petrarch into English language. The translation of the Petrarchan sonnets had stimulated a spirit of romanticism on many English poets who were influenced by these picturesque and emotional songs. Then shortly afterwards, they started to compose their own sonnets in accordance to their domestic moods and styles. Subsequently, the sonnet became popular in the English world of poetry as some poets’ names began to shine remarkably at that time. Among those names was William Shakespeare.

William Shakespeare, a poet, and a playwright, was one of the eminent sonnet (*14) composers in the world of English literature. He accomplished 154 sonnets in less than two decades starting from 1592 and he finished composing these sonnets no later than 1609. One of the most famous among his works is the “Sonnet 18”. In this sonnet, Shakespeare shows intense romantic emotions coupled with an unspeakable sentimental idea as he compares a beloved female to a summer’s day.

3. Literary translation is a shortcut to multiculturalism

Recalling these two great spirits, Petrarch and Shakespeare, I find a genuine yearning to transform this emotional and rhymed thoughts into Nobii through this textual translation. However, this is difficult in practice, for the reason that some of these poetic thoughts have never been thought in Nobii before. In fact, languages as tools of expression, face real challenge when there is an interconnection between two different human cultures. The French philosopher Michel Foucault addressed this lingual dilemma of transferring different human thoughts in the beginning of his book "The Order of Things". He discerned the phenomenon of having a variety of patterns and ways of human thinking, as he posed a deep philosophical question (*15): “What is impossible to be thought?”

Literary translation brings a partial answer to Foucault's question. Epistemologically, it conveys several introspective and insightful implications. By applying Foucault's philosophical approach, literary translation may take
the magic ways of those “heterotopias” (*16) to create sources of knowledge which storm cultures with unusual analytical patterns, naive linguistic constructions, and inexperienced cognitive valuables. It proves to us that even if our ways of thinking are dissimilar, the transmission of ideas from one human culture to another is brilliantly possible.

Literary translation is a complex cultural process through which further philosophical, sociological, and maybe political objectives are fulfilled besides the intended literary ones. That through literary translation human cultures are able to interchange their unique patterns no matter how big is the circle of difference between them. This is ingeniously and unintentionally realized through eliminating the initial cultural conditions which were born in the original literary text. Then giving birth to new cultural conditions when the same literary text is allocated into a different language. Thus, the process of literary translation counteracts locally and globally the supremacy of a single culture. Literary translation may be one of the best tools to resist monoculturalism and ethnocentrism. It opens up diverse ways of human thinkability and it brings out miscellaneous forms of human creativity. Perhaps the best example to elucidate this is the European literary translations during the Renaissance, which was one the important factors for the revitalization of the contemporary European languages and for the release of Europe from the grip of one Latin language and one Roman culture. Moreover, literary translation plays a major role in breaking the barriers of isolation among the different cultures of the world. It initiates indirect means of unconditional dialogues among these cultures. Therefore, the work of literary translation exceeds the lingual transfer of literary thoughts, to the transfer of cultural components, and the local intangible heritage associated with the community of the original text. This propagation of cultures is intellectually achieved whenever the literary text is dynamically travelling from one culture to another penetrating all the sociological and the ideological dimensions that isolate these cultures. Consequently, literary translation encourages cultural diversity as well as it emphasizes the creative distinctiveness and the cultural independability through the ever existence of multiculturalism which characterizes our diverse human societies.

4. The Shakespeare’s Sonnet 18, Original Text

In one of his glorious poetic works, the Sonnet 18, Shakespeare did create fourteen lines full of unusual poetic analogy and wonderful rhetorical pictures. This sonnet comes after what is known as the “procreation sonnets” i.e. (sonnets 1-17), as Shakespeare in this piece of poetry, changed theme to address a young lady instead of a young lord. Even though many may disagree with this opinion that Shakespeare is speaking to a beloved female for the gender of addressee is not overtly stated in this sonnet, but the type of poetic description is more likely to go well with a fair lady rather than a young lord as we may read through the following lines.

Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?
Thou art more lovely and more temperate:
Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May,
And summer’s lease hath all too short a date:
Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines,
And often is his gold complexion dimm’d:
By chance or nature’s changing course untrimm’d:
But thy eternal summer shall not fade
Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow’st;
Nor shall Death brag thou wander’st in his shade.
When in eternal lines to time thou grow’st:
So long as men can breathe or eyes can see,
So long lives this and this gives life to thee.

5. Nobiin Translation of Sonnet 18

The Nobiin translation of the text is inscribed below in a phonemic writing method, developed by the Nubian Language Society, which uses Old Nubian Script:

hikkir ay iddan fagon ug wEkka kikkilE?
Aweya! ay eskimun!
illin gittitOdilli, illin dessitOd avri
tUg pandilla dukkitAni,
foxossIga guqikacci
param tUglog kalAya wAyin
man avirki innatOn falafi
avirkil inni firgikkan, fagoxa urAdakir fa kAyi
avirkil inni haramin mAqla, jukkiltOn Ag timinji
avirkil inni naprEn koqla, filitta urmakir nAffi
avri mallEl ir kiqqin, alEg ur wEkka fa daffi
ixxir avri mallEkka, gur Ag kusma daffiddi
ilapId avirki innim, ugn apAkiddo wiyyan fl
The same Nobin text is shown below in the IPA Script with an interlinearized word to-word interpretation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>hikkir</th>
<th>ay</th>
<th>id-dan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>how</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>you-with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fagon-n</td>
<td>ug week-ka</td>
<td>kikkelee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>summer-off</td>
<td>day one</td>
<td>equate/compare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'How I equate/ compare you to a summer’ day’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aaweya</th>
<th>ay</th>
<th>fa</th>
<th>eski-mun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>will</td>
<td>can-not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>il-lin</td>
<td>gitti-tood-illi</td>
<td>il-lin</td>
<td>dessatood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you-are</td>
<td>most precious</td>
<td>you-are</td>
<td>the most</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'No! I cannot! You are the most precious and the most beautiful one’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tuug</th>
<th>bandi-lla</th>
<th>dukk-in-taan</th>
<th>fọğoss-ii-ga</th>
<th>guñi-kacc-in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>wind</td>
<td>the moor-in</td>
<td>blowingly</td>
<td>flowers/buds</td>
<td>shake</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'The wind blowingly shake the flowers/buds in the moor’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>baram</th>
<th>tuug-log</th>
<th>kalaay-a</th>
<th>waay-in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The flower of mimosa plant, wind-with</td>
<td>scatter</td>
<td>fly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tar</th>
<th>aʃirki</th>
<th>inna-toon</th>
<th>falafin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>it</td>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>your-from</td>
<td>coming out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'The flower of the mimosa plant, scatter and fly with the wind. It is coming from your beauty-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aʃirki-l</th>
<th>inni</th>
<th>firgi-kkan</th>
<th>fagon-ŋa</th>
<th>urrada- kir</th>
<th>fa</th>
<th>kaayin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>your</td>
<td>desire-if</td>
<td>summer</td>
<td>shortly</td>
<td>will</td>
<td>make</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'If your beauty desires, it will make the summer short’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aimki-l</th>
<th>inni</th>
<th>ala-s-s</th>
<th>la-wa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>your</td>
<td>sky-of</td>
<td>eye-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jukki-l-toon</td>
<td>aag</td>
<td>timinj-in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heat-in-from</td>
<td>is</td>
<td>shine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Your beauty is inside the eye of the sky shining from heat'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aimki-l</th>
<th>inni</th>
<th>ala-s-s</th>
<th>la-wa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>your</td>
<td>golden-off</td>
<td>face-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>filitta</td>
<td>urma-kir</td>
<td>naaffin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shine</td>
<td>blackly</td>
<td>hide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Your beauty blackly shines and hide in the golden face'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aafri</th>
<th>mallee-l</th>
<th>ir</th>
<th>ki-ppi-n</th>
<th>aleeg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>beautiful</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>without-off</td>
<td>truly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ug</td>
<td>week-ka</td>
<td>fa</td>
<td>daffin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>day</td>
<td>will</td>
<td>fade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'All beautiful except you, truly will fade one day'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aafri</th>
<th>mallee-l</th>
<th>ir</th>
<th>ki-ppi-n</th>
<th>aleeg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>beautiful</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>without-off</td>
<td>truly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ug</td>
<td>week-ka</td>
<td>fa</td>
<td>daffin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>day</td>
<td>will</td>
<td>fade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'So the earth will wipe out and destroy all beautiful'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>alabiid</th>
<th>aimki</th>
<th>inni-m</th>
<th>ug-n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>but</td>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>your</td>
<td>age-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abaak-iddo</td>
<td>wiyyan</td>
<td>fi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end-at</td>
<td>always</td>
<td>exist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'But your beauty will exist to the end of ages'
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aʃirki-l</th>
<th>inni</th>
<th>tuwwi-j-meen</th>
<th>agar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>your</td>
<td>scant-not</td>
<td>place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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'Your beauty does not scant/behave ungenerously, it is showing in all the places'

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'And never in its shade, the death can enter'

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'For as long as a soul is breathing and an eye can see'

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'It's you who will be alive'

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'And all this will give life to you. It's you who will be alive'
Commentary and Analysis

Shakespeare began his sonnet with this peculiar question: “Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?” and through this initiatory query we may recognize that as if he meant to confirm the impossibility of this comparison between his beloved and a summer's day. In fact this question carries a bit of a strange rhetoric analogy for the usual deal in the language of poetry is to establish a comparison between the beloved or her belongings with the components of nature such the sun, the moon, the stars, and the breeze. In this instant the beloved is compared to a summer's day. This is a type of rhetorical comparison which can be described as irrational but it is interesting at the same time. In the Nobiin version, the same question about this unusual comparison is raised in a deprecatory form so as to speak the invalidity of this analogy as the first line reads:

hikkir ay iddan fagon  ug  weekka  kikkleee? - ‘How can I equate/compare you to a summer’s day’

In other words, more incongruity and weirdness may sound through this question, in Nobiin language, especially after taking in consideration that the hot summer season is not usually a pleasant time in the Desert of Nubia. All the next lines, starting from the second one and below, represent answers and justifications for Shakespeare's precursory question of the first line. In the second line Shakespeare provides a quick answer to his question when he says: “Thou art more lovely and more temperate”. An identical respond spells out of the Nobiin text with further certainty so as to deny any possibility of making this comparison between the loved and a summer's days real. The Nobiin verse begins with the word ‘No’ followed by a negation form: aaweya! ay fa eskimun- ‘No! I cannot.’

The second line continues to affirm that the beloved is far more precious and far more beautiful. In the third line, Shakespeare carries on his justifications for refuting this figurative analogy between the beauty of his beloved and the beauty of the summer’s day by saying: “Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May”. In this line Shakespeare actually began to describe part of the summer scenes in his environment as he refers to the winds of May winds that move the growing buds. The Nobiin version resorts to build similar descriptive approach in the third and the fourth lines, but with changing a little bit in the scence according to the Nubian nature. This can be noticed especially in the fourth line of the Nobiin where the wind does not only shake the growing buds but it does scatter the fragrant flowers of the mimosa plant.

Shakespeare's picture about the blasting wind and the shaking of the buds unleashes simultaneously new dimensions of mythology, spiritual adoration, and mysticism in the Nubian mind. Especially if we may consider the maternalistic nature of the Nubian culture, where women are admiringly praised as sources of life. In correspondence to this, the Nobiin text in the ending part of the fourth line claims that this scattering buds of the the mimosa plant originates from the beauty of the beloved. To elaborate on this aspect of mysticism in the Nubian culture we may explore together how the concept of love is expressed in Nobiin poetry. In Nobiin folk songs, the beloved female is usually depicted, in the eyes of her admirer, as a sacred living being which manipulates the components of nature through her beauty and her uniqueness. Perhaps this is due to the nature of the maternal culture of the Nubian society. The idea Sanctity and divinity of the beloved female dominates many of Nobiin folk poems. An example for this, are these following verses, which are taken from a folk song written by the famous popular Nobiin poet Mohamed M. Abdun.

maaN ann guuɲji malleell ikka neele - ‘You are revealed in all what my eye can see.’

aman juugareegoon mafan dukkaree - ‘in the sound of the running water, in the sunrise.’

man fentin ollirin nuurin fakkil maafan tibidii aag araginallee - ‘In that imaginary /ollir/ i.e. rope hanger which appears when the reflecting of the eye of the sun is playing with the waves of the Nile and sending its rays to reflect within the shades of the palm trees.’

This mood of mysticism takes over through the Nobiin text as more descriptive pictures are drawn before our eyes particularly in the fifth line where the beauty of the fair lady is depicted as powerful force that mobilizes the nature and changes the seasons' lengths (summer's length). Another descriptive picture is seen in the sixth line when the beloved’s beauty is viewed as an eye of heaven i.e. a sun or a great illuminant star. In contrast to this intensive mood of mysticism, the Nobiin text holds, Shakespeare in his original text, favors the use of a harmonized combination between imagination and realism to describe the fairness of his addressed lady. For instance, in the fourth line he uses a legal term “lease” to indicate the short time of the summer. Also in the fifth line, he refers to factual information which is the sun is too hot but it shines. In the sixth line Shakespeare uses an expression of "a golden face that is dimmed" to refer to the sun which is covered by the clouds. In the Nobiin translation, the line seven conveys a different idea for the darkening of the golden face which is the beauty of the black beloved is blackly shining in the face of heaven and hiding there at the same time. This rhetoric pictures holds a poetic paradox of how the beauty of an African Nubian can shine and hide simultaneously.

In conclusion, both Shakespeare's and the Nobiin texts attempt to show that the beauty of the described beloved cannot be compared to anything in our existing world, it is an extraordinary and unspeakable beauty. This is prominently overstated in the Nobiin text in the lines 8, 9, and 10. In addition, both texts describes the beauty of the beloved as an eternal one that remains as long as a soul can ever breathe and an eye can ever see.

Notes
1. A local Nubian organization in North Sudan founded in 2005, which engages in the promotion and the documentation of the Nubian intangible heritage.
2. Nobiin is the Nile-Nubian language which is used for the translation of Shakespeare sonnet 18.
3. Gerald M. Browne, Old Nubian Grammar, p.1
4. Ibid.,
5. Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst, The History of Nobiin-1000 Years of Language Change, p.20
7. Humanism is a philosophical and intellectual movement led by pioneer European scholars, and during the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries through work of literature, poetry, fine arts, and literary translation.
(See, J. Kraye, The Cambridge companion to renaissance humanism, pp. 1-17).
8. Renaissance is an era attributed to a cultural movement that intensely influenced the European intellectual life following the Dark Ages. It began in the city of Florence in Italy in the
fourteenth century, and spread to the rest of Europe by the sixteenth century.
9. F. Petrarca, Thomas Campbell, The sonnets, triumphs, and other poems of Petrarcli, p. xv
10. F. Kinder, M. Bucur, R. Mathisen, Making Europe: The story of the west since 1300, p. 342
11. A. Durant, N. Fabb, Literary Studies in Action, p. 117
12. M. Klarer, An Introduction to Literary Studies, p. 69
16. Heterotopia is a philosophical concept presented by Michel Foucault to describe identified spaces that surround the subject or the object in the social realm to reduce the achievement of its independence and the sense of its self-uniqueness (Ibid., p. Xviii)
19. A local Nubian association, to which the author belongs, which is formed in 2005 attributed to the promotion and documentation of the Nubian intelligible heritage with more focus on the language.

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Army Chaplains in the Mahdist War

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Abstract
The Mahdist War represented a literal manifestation of an imagined global struggle between Christianity and Islam. Although figures like the Mahdi, Gordon, Kitchener, and Churchill are arguably the conflict’s most celebrated figures, chaplains were among the British force’s most esteemed figures. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper examines the role of army chaplains in the Mahdist War. Because the Mahdist period witnessed a relative pause in missionary activity, the work of army chaplains can be said to have represented the most important Christian work in Sudan during the conflict. Due to this reality and the contemporary relationship between mission and military work, army chaplains warrant a place in a Sudanese mission historiography that has largely ignored them.

Keywords
Mahdist War, Christianity, Chaplains, Missions, Army

In 1881 Muhammad Ahmad called for Muslims to throw off the yoke of the Turco-Egyptian regime. In the violence that ensued, diplomat-soldier Charles Gordon was killed in the siege of Khartoum. After a series of military expeditions (*ii), Anglo-Egyptian forces defeated Mahdist forces by capturing the strongholds of Khartoum and Omdurman and killing the Mahdi’s successor, Abdullah Khalifa, in 1899. Although figures like the Mahdi, Gordon, Kitchener, and Churchill are arguably the most celebrated figures of the War, chaplains were among the conquering British force’s most esteemed figures. In Major-General Evelyn Wood’s memoir of the war, Catholic chaplain Robert Brindle was described as ‘doubtless the most popular man in the [Nile] Expedition.’ Brindle was one of several chaplains that provided spiritual support, medical aid, and practical assistance during the march. Missionaries frequently served as temporary military chaplains and were often the only ordained ministers available to soldiers, making the British Army ‘a natural constituency for the overseas missionary. (*iii)

This paper examines the work of army chaplains in the Anglo-Egyptian Army. Because the period bookended by the

Religious Context of the Mahdist War

The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the evangelical movement and colonial incursions into new regions in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. These dual realities encouraged many to blend commercial and political impulses with the moral responsibility to spread the Gospel to Muslims and ‘heathens.’ In 1879 Henry Harris Jessup of Beirut’s American Presbyterian Mission argued that in England and America Providence had raised up Anglo-Saxon Christian powers equipped with the resources needed to bring Muslims to Christ (*v). With the poetic imagery of the Christian Lion pouncing upon Islamic Egypt, the military intervention that quelled the ‘Urabi Revolt signaled the beginning of British dominion there and ushered in a heightened level of martial rhetoric within missionary and Muslim circles. Major-General F. Haig of the Church Missionary Society’s (CMS) Parent Committee opined that “the days of the Mohammedan Antichrist are numbered. The disintegration of the Turkish Empire proceeds apace.” (*vi) Three years later an article appeared in the Church Missionary Intelligencer and Record stating that “Mohammedanism is not a dubious ally, but an avowed antagonist.” (*vii)

Against the backdrop of this imagined conflict between Christianity and Islam, Rev. A.H. Male—who had served as an army chaplain in Egypt—claimed that ‘it was our bounden duty to provide for the spiritual as well as the temporal wants of our soldiers. This military work of ours was essentially missionary in spirit and results.’ (*viii) Some took the connection between soldiers’ morality and Christian advancement further with the claim that this association transformed soldiers into pseudo-missionaries. Bishop John Taylor Smith of Sierra Leone was once told that “he might be nominated to a position which would give him the best chance of dealing with the largest
missionary society in the world—namely, the soldiers of the British Army, who go into all countries and are watched by the believers in Moslem and Hindu faiths as an example of what Christianity is...if the soldier is brought to the knowledge of Jesus Christ he and his fellows become members of a very fine missionary society scattered through the world.” (*ix)

After Britain’s Occupation of Egypt, British and American missionaries began to argue that a modern crusade was needed to create spiritual and territorial conquests. In this milieu Sub-Saharan Africans became prime targets in the imagined race between Islam and Christianity. If British optimists believed that European colonial incursions into Islamic regions like northern Nigeria, the Senegambia, and Algeria signaled Christianity’s strength over Islam, missionaries working for the CMS in Africa grew increasingly concerned at what they perceived as Islam’s breakneck expansion (particularly in the East African hinterland and West African coast). In the nineteenth century West Africa experienced Sultan Al-Haj Umar’s jihads and Samori Ture’s movements. Although Collins noted Islam’s scant growth of the Muslim population in those parts, the Christian colonial conquest nevertheless spurred a reactionary Islamic spread among communities like the Bambara, Soninke, and Wolof in Senegal (*x). Against the backdrop of Africa’s increased importance in the envisioned struggle between Christianity and Islam, Charles Gordon thrust Sudan to the forefront of the envisioned conflict.

After winning fame in the Crimean War and subsequently as an officer during the Taipeng Rebellion, Charles Gordon became Governor-General of Equatoria in 1873. Following his success in suppressing the slave trade, Gordon was made Governor-General of Sudan in 1877. His efforts to stamp out Sudanese slave caravans earned him esteem as an unwavering warrior fighting an immoral institution. This praise was paired with the already popular rumors of his nearly unbelievable level of piety, further entrenching him in the media as a Christian hero. Although he left his post as Governor-General in 1879, his popularity compelled Gladstone’s ministry to give him the responsibility of evacuating the Egyptian garrison stationed at Khartoum. Gordon arrived in February 1884 (*xi). After a stubborn resistance against the Mahdi’s approaching forces, Gordon was beheaded in January 1885. The degree to which Gordon’s death cemented his status as not only a British but distinctly Christian hero can be ascertained by statements made to Gordon’s siblings. Garnet Wolseley opined to Gordon’s brother Henry, “His example will be one that fathers will hold up to their sons in England, and as long as any faith in God remains to us as a Nation...so long will your brother be quoted and referred to as the human embodiment of all manly and Christian virtues.” W.T. Stead wrote to Gordon’s sister Augusta, “Your brother’s death has done more to make Christ real to people than if he had civilized a hundred Congos and smashed a thousand Mahdis.” (*xii) Lord Salisbury saw in the Reconquest an opportunity to war with a country that was particularly disreputable, noting “our desire to extirpate from the earth one of the vilest despotisms...ever seen...compared with which the worst performances of the worst minions of the Palace at Constantinople are bright and saintly deeds.” (*xiii)

**Chaplains in the River War**

Against the backdrop of Gordon’s death and the Mahdiya’s ill-repute, chaplains joined British troops in their trek to Khartoum. Though chaplains were recorded on the army’s payroll as far back as 1300, the Army Chaplains’ Department was formally created in 1796. Responsible for caring for soldiers’ spiritual needs, they were not only expected to bring God’s word to troops and warn them of the evils of dishonorable conduct but to also instill military virtues (*xiv). Owen Watkins offered a valuable glimpse into chaplaincy duties on the march to Khartoum in his primary account With Kitchener’s Army: being a chaplain’s experiences with the Nile expedition, published in 1899. Born in 1873, Watkins entered the ministry in 1896 and spent his entire career in the armed forces. Serving in Malta, Crete, South Africa and the Sudan (among other locations), he authored four books about his experiences (*xv). In a portion of With Kitchener’s Army that concerns the march to Khartoum, Watkins writes the following description of his work:

‘Here I had my first experience of what a Chaplain’s duties were upon the march, and I cannot say that I found them pleasant. The men of the brigade...were falling out of the ranks in great numbers, utterly exhausted and borne down with the heat of the sun. Medical officers and Chaplains brought up the rear, doing their utmost to persuade the men to yet another effort; shaming some, lending a hand to others by carrying their accoutrements and rifle, or giving them a ride on their horses, and in the worst cases handing them over to the ambulance camels to be brought into camp.’ (*xvi)

Some chaplains achieved fame in the British Army, and those who participated in the River War were no exception. Padre George Smith received a Clasp [please explain], while Fr. Robert Brindle ‘covered his chest with British and Turkish medals earned in the Sudan and Egypt.’ (*xvii) The Anglican Church’s Rev. A.W.B. Watson gained his soldiers’ adoration through his tireless work among cholera patients during the 1896 Dongola Expedition, and highlights the efforts of chaplains and medical officers who encouraged soldiers on the march by ‘shaming some, lending a hand to others by carrying their accoutrements...giving them a ride on their horses, and in the worst cases handing them over to the ambulance camels to be brought into camp.’ (*xviii)

Of all the chaplains that served in Sudan, Fr. Roger Brindle stood out from the rest. Attached to the Royal Irish Regiment, Brindle was among the most respected men in the army. When in 1882 British troops landed in Egypt, Brindle was present at the Battle of Tel el-Kebir. Following
this service, Brindle accompanied the 1st Battalion throughout the entire Nile Expedition. When Sir Garnet Wolseley offered a £100 prize to the unit that arrived first with stores intact, Brindle captained the winning boat (Lord Wolseley, on multiple occasions, tried to get Brindle knighted). Aside from the religious duties he performed, Wood praised him for encouraging the men through acts like marching rather than riding his horse and, with blistered fingers, pulling the oar of the lead boat carrying the Royal Irish down the Nile. During the advance to Omdurman Brindle took a gunboat into action and ministered to troops during a cholera outbreak. He was present when over 550 men were killed or wounded in less than thirty minutes. Hearing that a Catholic soldier was dying in a camp, Brindle made sure to attend to him (*xix). The Catholic newspaper Tablet reported the feat as follows:

‘An act of devotion of Father Brindle, the Roman Catholic chaplain, who has been through so many campaigns, deserves to be recorded, says the special correspondent of The St. James's Gazette. When lately stationed at Darmali camp with the 1st Brigade, he happened to hear that a private of his flock in the Northumberland Fusiliers in 2nd Brigade, stationed at Atbara, where there was no priest, was lying dangerously ill, and he afterwards died. Father Brindle walked the ten miles to Atbara in the early morning of Sunday, administered the last Sacraments to the man, and returned to Darmali in time to celebrate Mass to the troops there, thus accomplishing a record Sunday’s duty.’ (*xx)

The Battle of Omdurman was fought in September 1898. To all ranks he must have appeared like an Old Testament prophet leading his people through the wilderness.’ (*xxiv)

The army’s central role in conducting the ceremony is crucial to the army-as-missionary narrative, for by paying homage to Gordon the soldiers appropriated the Christian piety that the fallen hero had exhibited in his lifetime. Following the Battle of Omdurman, Kitchener’s forces descended upon the site where Gordon was killed. A memorial ceremony in his honor was performed with a saturation of Scripture readings, hymns, and pageantry which could only befit the honor of a man who was considered to have been the consummate Christian warrior. However, Watkins used the ceremony as an occasion to remark on what he perceived as a striking performance of religious solidarity. He expressed shock at seeing “black Mohammedans” playing the Christian hymn “Abide with Me,” noting that it was “a fitting thing, over the grave of one of such wide sympathies and catholic spirit, that Christian and Mohammedan, Romanist and Puritan, should unite and lay aside for the time their differences.” (*xxv) The notion that the chaplain Watkins could make such a statement should call into question whether other Christian clergy went against the polarizing religious rhetoric of the time by discussed the benefits of Christian-Muslim toleration and/or solidarity.

This issue is further magnified by the positive reputation that Islam reportedly had among British soldiers in the Nile expedition. According to David Steele, British soldiers in Kitchener’s expedition esteemed Islam, believing that it was simple and emphasized military virtues (*xxvi). Several officers took an unfavorable stance towards Christianity and the pacifying effect it could have on black troops revered for their martial abilities. Sudanese soldiers were critical to Britain’s military successes in northeast Africa, filling the ranks of Mahdist forces winning respect among their British counterparts. Due to their possible future value, Colonel H.W. Jackson argued that missionaries should not have access to the black pagan tribes which had fought for the Mahdi. He pleaded to Cromer that “converting the blacks to Christianity will be the ruin of these…tribes…A black when converted becomes a scamp, loafer, scoundrel and liar.” The belief that Islam contained positive virtues and that Christianity could corrupt than beneficiary flew in the face of the martial, (please correct grammar) ‘clash of civilizations’ type rhetoric that others espoused in the late nineteenth century. Jackson’s comment, therefore, opens the door to compare military views on the utility of Christianity and Islam in Sudan with contemporary dialogues on the two faiths among non-military British officials and missionaries.

Islam notwithstanding, there is also the issue of how missionaries were generally perceived by other Britons in Sudan at that time. In March 1899 Milo Talbot wrote a letter to his sister Fanny from Omdurman. Responding to a Kipling piece in the Times about taking up the White Man’s Burden, Talbot opined the following:

One wonders what is to be the good of it all, whether we really do improve the black races with whom we come into contact or not. Its very doubtful. In another year, I suppose we shall have a swarm of missionaries up here. They ‘ll do no good at all. I mean they’ll make no converts, but they’ll be useful as doctors & if they teach industries, they may do good…I am a little jaundiced about missionaries, as I know they will give me an awful lot of trouble with the natives.’ (*xxvii)

Perhaps unbeknownst to Talbot at the time, discussions had
already begun a year before about the possibility of medical mission work in Khartoum. Indeed, missionaries used Kitche-
ner’s trek south as a perfect occasion to penetrate the heart of Sudan: right behind with the conquering army. In May 1898, 
the Church Missionary Society’s Dr. F.J. Harpur suggested 
that a national subscription be made for a hospital dedicated 
Gordon’s memory in Khartoum (*xxix) . Harpur also suggested 
that a swift effort be made for a Medical Mission in the city. 
Each proposal was made in light of the Bishop of Lincoln’s 
suggestion that something be done to perpetuate Gordon’s 
memory once the army reached Khartoum. Two months later 
and with Kitchener steadily advancing, Dr. Harpur reiterated 
that any venture to Khartoum should be decidedly medical, 
that he and another doctor were ready to go, and that a host of 
women had also inquired as to whether they might be able to 
volunteer in Khartoum (*xxix) . On September 16th, almost 
two weeks after the Battle of Omdurman and with nearby 
Khartoum under British control, a ‘Miss F.M. Sells’ commun-
icated from Old Cairo that she desired to work in the newly-
conquered country: she offered ‘her services for the Soudan should the way open. Has heard much of the cruelty and suf-
ferring of the Soudanese from Christian soldiers returning to 
Cairo.’ (Clarify the preceding sentence please.) While Sells 
almost certainly meant that Christian soldiers returning to 
Cairo had told her of Sudanese suffering, a sensationalized 
moment.

Watkins responded with disgust, refuting his 
charges with a meticulous defense of the soldiers. Although 
he conceded that he did see some wounded men at Omdur-
man killed, those who were killed had first refused to lay 
down their arms and were even bayoneted in the act of firing 
on Anglo-Egyptian soldiers. He also admitted that the Mah-
di’s Tomb was destroyed and his corpse disposed of but justi-
ﬁed these actions with the practicality of the moment—the 
bombardment had already rendered the Tomb irreparable, it 
was necessary to remove all vestiges of the Mahdi’s inﬂuence 
that might kindle future subversive fervor, and his body was 
removed to eliminate possible pilgrimages. Acknowledging 
that such actions could still be considered terrible regardless 
of their justiﬁcation, Watkins stated that war is never lovely. 
(*xxxii)

Watkins’ defense is particularly important when consid-
ering the damaging impact such accusations could have had 
on the prospect of British missionaries working in Omdurman 
and Khartoum. Bennett had argued that in light of such vio-
ence ‘it is useless to try and promote Christianity if the mis-
ionaries come from people who again and again disregard 
every law of humanity and decency in their treatment of van-
quished races (*xxxiii).’ Watkins dispelled Bennett because 
he wanted the British people to believe that soldiers were in 
fact reformed, honorable Christians. Prior to the Battle of 
Omdurman his memoir was ﬁlled with claims that the sol-
diers were living with honor, leading their own Bible studies 
and were some of the noblest characters he had ever met. One 
invading soldiers and the city’s inhabitants, four reasons were 
given for the prohibition: 1) the people were fanatical Mus-
lins, 2) the government’s position and that of the missionary 
es, 3) the Sudanese already thought that the object of the British 
conquest was to convert them, and 4) missionaries would be 
looked upon as government ofﬁcials (*xxxvi). Llewellyn 
Gwynne—future longtime Anglican Bishop of the Sudan— 
was one of the CMS missionaries momentarily banned by 
Kitchener from doing work in northern Sudan. There was one 
task, however, that he would allow Gwynne to do: evangeliz-
ing the British ofﬁcers and non-commissioned ofﬁcers at-
tached to the Egyptian army. In Kitchener’s estimation there 
were “plenty of heathen among them.” (*xxxvii)

Conclusion

In a rhetorical environment that pitted Christianity and 
Islam against one another, the Mahdist War repre-
sented a literal manifestation of the wider imagined
worldwide struggle between the two faiths. While British soldiers were popularly characterized as a Christian force, army chaplains assumed an important role in the everyday activities of the campaign and—through Watkins—debunked disparaging rumors about the Anglo-Egyptian force. It is easy to think of the Mahdist War as a pause between the mission work that had started decades earlier and the larger work that began after the guns went silent. The Mahdists imprisoned many members of the Comboni Mission (some died), and Vicar-Apostolic Mgr. Francesco Sogaro ordered missionaries to withdraw from Khartoum to Cairo. Joseph Ohrwahlder’s captivity narrative ‘Ten Years’ in the Mahdi’s Camp is the only major piece written by a missionary during the war and makes no mention of chaplains (*xxxviii). With these realities, one could reasonably conclude that missionaries that worked in Sudan in the 19th and 20th centuries left little if any evidence of their perceptions of or encounters with army chaplains like Watkins or Brindle. These facts notwithstanding, there is sufficient evidence to argue that the military chaplains discussed here warrant a place in the historiography of mission work in Sudan that has ignored them. That the Mahdiya period represents a gap in official mission work further points to the importance of incorporating army chaplains’ work into studies of Sudanese Christian history. With the fall of al Obeid (and the consequent end of Kordofan’s three mission stations) the Catholic Central African Mission effectively finished, and following the defeat at Shai-kin the missionaries left Khartoum for Shellal and Cairo. Sudan’s missionary movement did not resume until Kitchener defeated the Mahdist forces. To this end, the chaplaincy work that occurred in the invading Army represents some of the only documented work that Christian clergy performed in Sudan in the years leading up to the Battle of Omdurman (*xxxix). Finally, the fact that Kitchener’s victory was directly responsible for resuscitating the missionary movement in Sudan firmly links the country’s missionary history with the Anglo-Egyptian Army. As Presbyterian missionary Charles Watson articulated a few years after the Reconquest, ‘What means the history of this land…with its bloodshed and war, with its death of Gordon and its reconquest of the country by Herbert Kitchener, what is it all but a dramatic call to the Church of God to enter in and occupy the land for Christ?’ (*xl) Army chaplaincy work could serve as an important bridge for scholars to link Sudan’s religious and military historiographies. In more recent history military chaplains have worked in the SPLM/A. After the Chukudum Conference of 1994, Kakwa church leaders were concerned about SPLA atrocities against civilians and appealed to John Garang for army chaplains. In 1996 the Lui (*xli). John Daau, founder and editor of the Christian Times, shared with me that ‘in the SPLA, there were so many chaplains. It was given the attention to have a prominent leadership in the army. It was a structure ready for chaplaincy and pastors who were there and church ministry was available. (*xlii) Many of the chaplains had first served as soldiers and, after leaving the military, became ordained and returned to the military. Speaking in 2013, Daau noted that Christian and Muslim chaplains could be found in army barracks (*xlii). While South Sudanese chaplains have received attention in recent years (*xliv), it would be useful to connect these recent developments with the longer history of military chaplaincy in Sudan (whatever history that might be). Doing so would add an important historiographical link between the histories of Sudanese Christianity and militarism.

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Notes
I. G.W. Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartum. 7th ed. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1898), 314. Psalm 15 begins by asking, ‘Lord, who may dwell in your sacred tent? Who may live on your holy mountain?’ (15:1). It proceeds to list a series of virtues (15:2-5) and culminates with the assertion that those who possess these qualities ‘will never be shaken.’ (15:5). Each quotation is taken from the New International Version.


IV. Ibid, 225.


VIII. For Male’s quote see “Wesleyan Foreign Missions,” Cheshire Observer, February 12, 1887, 2. Greg Dening examines a similar effect that sailors in the Marquesas Islands in discrediting the missionary witness by drinking and soliciting prostitutes at port. See Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land: Marquesas, 1774-1880 (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1980), 183. His work has influenced my approach on how I examine military operations in relation to missionary work, particularly soldiers’ conduct in areas that missionaries proselytized (or wanted to).


Introduction
Thanks to the experience of conducting research in Sudan since the 1970s I was in a unique position to comment and write about professional anthropological ethics over several decades and to participate in the discipline’s dialogue regarding ethics and research. I have published numerous articles and several books on the subject (1979; 2003; 2013), and helped to bring the principle of informed consent into anthropology (1993).

In our experience the research environment in Sudan has generally been a welcoming one and from 1970 until the present moment we have been granted visas and received permission to carry out our research, for me in the area of law and anthropology and Shari’a and for Richard in urban anthropology, especially on Tuti Island in the center of Khartoum. As young graduate students at Northwestern University’s African Studies programs in 1970 we waited for several months before being granted visas to enter Sudan and counter-intuitively we were fortunate to have become acquainted with one of Sudan’s most distinguished scholar Mohamed Abu Salim while we waited for several weeks before receiving approval to carry out our doctoral research in the country. That period from 1970 to 1972 proved to be formative not only for a young married couple but for our lifelong love of Sudan and Sudanese. We learned Arabic, we lived in a houseboat on the Blue Nile, drove around town in an Italian Vespa and we became immersed in an intellectually stimulating environment that made every day an adventure. We also witnessed in 1971 first-hand one of several transformations of Sudan since its independence with the Hashim al-Atta coup and Jaafar Numieri counter-coup. Although the welcoming culture of Sudanese has always made research a pleasure, it was the complexity of Sudanese politics which engaged me with difficult ethical questions that sharpened my thinking and writing on the subject. I focused on Islamic law with initial research in 1979-80 and return visits up until 1988, but it was not until the years of the extremism of the Bashir-Turabi collaboration from 1989 until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that I decided that it was better to work outside of the country and continue my connection to Sudan through our professional organization the Sudan Studies Association, for which I was a co-founder in 1981. After the signing of the CPA in 2005 I began to conceive of research that would comprehend the social transformation that had occurred in the nearly two decades of Sudan’s Islamism since my last major research. I was awarded a grant from the US Institute of Peace to examine the application of Shari’a in the intervening years since my 1987 publication of Islamic law and Society in the Sudan.

In my view, ethics is not a merely subject to be considered when seeking approval of research proposals by institutional review boards (IRBs in the US), it IS the essence of our research projects wherever they may take place and within the context of every discipline. Anthropology in the US, as the comprehensive science of the study of our species, represents a totality of research possibilities for the cultural, biological, historical, and linguistic study of humanity. Although formal consideration of the ethical and moral aspects and consequences of research came late and as a result of various historical crises in the field, nonetheless there has been a thoughtful and vibrant discourse in anthropology in the U.S. and in the world about the methods and ramifications of anthropological research in an ever more complex and challenging world. In the Sudans researchers must be mindful not only of the political intricacies but of the special consideration to be taken when researching the two nations’ many vulnerable peoples.

Do No Harm and Informed Consent in Sudans’ Research
What does applying the core principle ‘to do no harm’ mean in Sudans’ research? Which populations or segments of populations –vulnerable people—need to be considered. Vulnerable populations are too numerous to enumerate. They can include all women and girls in highly patriarchal societies with specific human rights considerations of domestic and family violence, female circumcision, education restrictions, or persons living in Internally Displaced Camps, such as the many scattered all over the major cities and conflict zones in the Sudan, such as in Darfur and along border areas between the north and south prior to 2011. In post-independence South Sudan with the lack of resolution of longstanding inter-ethnic conflicts, refugee camps have proliferated or spread across borders into neighboring countries. Sudans’ displaced rights as ‘research subjects’ are as diminished as every other human right of which they are deprived in what can amount to extreme cases of vulnerability.

Another major concern for consideration of harm in research is the canon of cultural relativism in anthropology. This canon has been tested with the issue of female circumcision (tahur) as both indigenous and western anthropologists came to the fore in public discussions of what is harm from multiple perspectives of cultural difference and similarity. Ellen Guenbaum, Rogaia Abo Sharaif, and Asma Abdel Halim have written thoughtfully on the subject, and I wrote a piece on female circumcisions, cultural relativism and universal rights that was published in the Chronicle of Higher Education (1995) and then widely reprinted in which I took the position that cultural relativism should be suspended as a defense of the practice in favor of the universal right of the child and of women not to be
harmed by the normative cultural presence of circumcision. My view stemmed from an anthropologist’s first-hand knowledge of the practice and the indigenous views that were shared with me in Arabic and in English regarding the painful and lifelong consequences of the operation. Are culturally normative customs that result in harm considered to be less harmful or morally acceptable? Philosophers have debated the issue and mainly decided in favor of the universal rights of humanity that do not and cannot sanction a known or predictable harm being carried out under the general justification of cultural norms. It was my view that these gaps can be bridged through intercultural conversations and negotiations, and indeed the practice of female circumcision has been greatly modified and in many cases eliminated due to the educational efforts of Sudanese, especially from Ahfad University and the activism of women and local advocates of the rights of women and the girl child.

In the end, the admonition to ‘Do No Harm’ might be substituted with the more inspirational ‘Do Some Good’ when conducting research and a new trend in collaborative anthropology envisions joint projects that are geared not only to research but also positive outcomes for the people being studied. **Informed Consent** in research is best viewed as a process, especially in the Sudans where burn-out, cynicism, research and aid fatigue are pronounced in populations exposed to chronic conflict, war, and government indifference.

The discourse on informed consent in the social sciences has extended to recognized vulnerable populations, such as indigenous peoples; ethnic, racial, gender, class, and other social and political minorities; and to victims of human rights abuses. I have argued that informed consent does not necessarily need to be fulfilled by signing a form but it can be obtained through a direct conversation.

**Informed Consent without forms or formalism; issues of legal-ethical accountability**

One of the first hurdles to be overcome was the possibility of obtaining informed consent without the necessity of using signed forms as some anthropologists work with non-literate or illiterate populations, in a variety of global settings and in U.S. I argued in 1994 that informed consent in anthropological research can and perhaps even should be obtained without the use of the legalistic forms that have dominated the application of the doctrine in the U.S. Indeed, a primary reason for the previous rejection of informed consent in anthropology was the standard requirement of such forms. A conversation with research participants, periodically updated as the research evolves and conditions and personalities change, can and should be sufficient, however the researcher should keep a record and participants should have an opportunity to read and edit the results of the research and perhaps withdraw consent if the she/he thinks it might result in harm to those studied or to the participant. This is not a theoretical question for research in the two Sudans.

All research involving vulnerable populations must be reviewed not only by the relevant IRB, but also by multiple layers of accountable persons or institutions, including funders, national or tribal research boards, and the profession. Where increased vulnerability exists, as with HIV+ persons, that process and documentation needs to be “double blind,” in the sense that multiple parties with no vested interest in the research be consulted for approval.

Openness and disclosure and models of collaborative research that incorporate informed consent are all components of anthropological research that is fully current with developments taking place in the world we study and the professions that study it. Informed consent may only be a convenient summary term for what has taken place in biomedical and social science research, but when its spirit is implemented it results in better researchers and better research.

**Researching within a research environment of chronic militarism and lack of free speech (abstracted from Introduction to my Shari’a and Islamism in Sudan: conflict, law and social transformation, 2012)**

Military regimes have been in place during the entire period of the accumulated nearly five decades of research in Sudan (1970-2016), and for all these years the nation has been in a declared “state of emergency.” I knowingly and with my consent accept the potential restrictions upon my freedom to observe events and meet with individuals in the society. I have always been granted a visa from successive military governments, which is by no means automatic. I am open about my research project, its sponsors, intended outcome(s); increasingly my work is translated into Arabic and subjected to local scrutiny and debate. I am transparent, and do not use deception with anyone—if this is required for meeting an individual or observing an event, I avoid these situations. I take advantage of my outsider status and language skills to listen to complaints and information from individuals that is not available in the public domain.

In the field I may observe, but never participate in public demonstrations or protests against the lack of freedoms in the military regimes. I do, of course, write about these. I strive to be objective in my public interviews and commentaries, despite a desire to have me take political stands on a variety of issues. I “respect” the reality of the general lack of freedoms of speech, assembly, etc. and the potential harm it represents for the participants who choose to collaborate in my research. Vulnerable populations, e.g. hr victims, are a particular concern.

Outside of Sudan I freely criticize, on the public record, the lack of freedoms, denial of human rights, etc. for citizens of Sudan. I frequently serve as an expert witness in political asylum cases where the conditions of chronic militarism are at issue. Openness and negotiation of the known risks and benefits of research with informed individuals within an otherwise restricted environment has been my modus operandi.

**Moral Choices: Chronic Conflict Zones and Humanitarian Crises: Sudan**

The case of Sudan is one of a nation plagued by war, chronic conflict and ethnic cleansing over decades. Twenty-two years of civil war resulted in the separation of the country into North and South Sudan in 2011. It is a case that received much international attention over its politics, but little reflection upon the complexities of anthropologists engaging and researching in a context defined by its chronic conflict and resulting humanitarian crises. This is not a hypothetical case, but one with a real, mostly unexamined, history involving opportunities as well as pitfalls for ethical engagement by anthropologists for research or contract employment with a host of potential employers, from defense and intelligence to humanitarian aid organizations.

One dilemma faced by the anthropologist is to decide if and how to engage with a country that has become notorious for human rights violations. Which options might be selected or declined among the multiple opportunities for employment as applied anthropologists with US AID, a host of NGOs operating in the country, and governmental or non-
governmental funding of academic research. My research trips to Sudan were often met with the moral question, “Professor, can’t you do something about Darfur?” “Oh, are you going to [Sudan] to help deliver food to those poor people?” At times or in certain circumstances there are conditions that are so morally and ethically complex that they can have a paralytic effect upon an “expert” anthropologist, or at least a case of temporary paralysis. Despite an intense moral urge to ‘do something,’ these are circumstances where it may be better to ‘do’ nothing, or to engage minimally. In my experience, Sudan is such a case.

Anthropological research is always a challenge, and ethical decision making is rarely simple or straightforward. If it is thought to be simple, then it may be better to have a second look. But considering the range of ethically conscious employment or research in a divided nation, wracked by civil war and chronic conflict, especially deadly and socially devastating in the past 20 years, the complexity of those choices can be challenging both to the researcher and the oversight bodies. Sudan has had conflicts described as “Arab and Muslim” against “African and Christian/animist” as “Arab and Janjaweed ‘devils on horseback’ against ‘blacks’ of Darfur. This is a nation where the US and key allies alleged genocide in a dangerous war of words that not only failed the test of critical international intervention in such cases, but probably intensified suffering as western humanitarian aid groups were denied access. The world’s most serious moral charge of genocide actually became a cheapened idea where any mass killing or death could be characterized as such, and could well have been deployed to distract attention from contemporaneous events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. The deaths in Kenya after its trouble-delinquent elections in 2008 became a ‘genocide’ and the suffering masses in Zimbabwe under a corrupt dictator was also a ‘genocide.’

During the years of the Darfur conflict as Sudan was accused of carrying out ‘genocide’ a French NGO “Zoe’s Ark” kidnapped a number of Fur and Zaghawa children along the Sudan-Chad border, wrapped bloodied bandages around their limbs and heads and claimed they were orphans that the NGO saved. They were being taken to France for adoption when their ‘intervention’ was stopped. The children’s parents protested that they were not orphans and Chadian authorities arrested and tried the humanitarians for international kidnapping. Adding to the moral complexity, Sudan’s head of state, Omer al-Bashir, was issued a warrant for arrest for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) that neither the country of the accused nor many of its accusers, including the US, are signatories. On matters of international politics and morality, it has been noted that a majority of the recent ICC arrest warrants or indictments for 30 persons, all of whom are African. It is highly improbable that war crimes and human rights abuses are concentrated solely in Africa. Moreover, on the moral question of the death penalty, the US has been criticized as the only major western democracy which still carries out executions and the racial and class bias of the application of the death penalty has been repeatedly noted.

In Darfur western humanitarian aid organizations predominated and rely on local translators and social scientists--including anthropologists--to assist them. Increasingly, the western researcher him/herself is a subject of suspicion in this complex environment, and the relations of trust upon which the anthropologist relies are no longer a given. Where is the right and the wrong, the moral and immoral, the ethical and unethical in all of this for the anthropologist to support-- or deny support--to defend or critique-- to engage, or refrain from engagement? For nearly two decades anthropologists and other researchers effectively boycotted work in Sudan. However, when the first of a series of peace accords was signed in 2005, I returned, with a handful of others in 2005, funded by two European university grants through the European Union, and subsequently for research in 2007-09 funded by the US Institute of Peace.

This return added more complexity to the ethical, moral, and professional questions I faced regarding continued research in Sudan. As Sudan’s problems erupted across the world media, I as a cultural expert was presented with multiple opportunities for professional engagement. As a founder and twice past president of the Sudan Studies Association, I was received as a country expert whose commentaries, in private and public, were scrutinized. Attempting to retain the objectivity of the social scientist, I found myself invited to go on the record with the print and electronic media. I found myself in awkward public contexts where I was asked to express in Arabic nuanced differences between Islam and Islamism, between Muslim and Christian political opponents to the regime, and to the attitude of the US and the West to Islam and Islamist movements. This terrain of moral complexity consisted of multiple government armed forces, residents and their overseers of camps of the Internally Displaced (IDPs), and innumerable international and indigenous humanitarian intervention agents, including both indigenous and western anthropologists hired to facilitate and improve program implementation. Negotiating this terrain was always challenging, but also stimulating of a continuous assessment of ethical choices and possible outcomes, and the balancing of ethics and morality considering both the right thing to do professionally as an anthropologist and personally as a human being. It is easier to rely on the fundamentals in these day to day choices: avoid or reduce harm; discuss or obtain consent; be transparent about the research goals and funding; do not lie; be collaborative and try to find a way to give back to those who provide information. I have often remarked while in the field, somewhat sardonically, that “a bad day in the field was still better than a good day doing committee work at home.”

Challenges of Research, from U.S. and Sudanean sides

From 2007-2008, as a recipient of a research grant from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), I was required to comply with the sanctions levied upon the Sudan by the US government. The US Congress funds the USIP. Previous research in 2005 was funded by a European Union grant to two Universities, Bordeaux in France and Leiden in Holland, and was not subjected to the sanctions’ restrictions. Fear of legal complications and potential sanctions violations with the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC that manages the sanctions) by the attorney for the Rhode Island Department of Higher Education led her to advise my home institution, Rhode Island College, not to administer the USIP grant. For a time I was fearful that the perceived pariah status of Sudan would prevent me from carrying out the proposed research. The US Institute of Peace was patient and advised that any non-profit organization might administer the grant. The Sudan Studies Association (SSA), founded at Rhode Island College 26 years earlier, decided to accept the grant administration responsibility. This unusual problem of locating a grant administrator was just the first challenge.

In order to accept the grant and have it administered by a US non-profit institution, I had to agree to conditions set out by OFAC that was actually implementing an “exemption” as a
research scholar from the full measure of sanctions. According to the terms outlined in a formal letter of understanding between me and OFAC, I was not permitted to take with me to Sudan any electronic equipment, including my PC laptop, digital camera, cell phone, or other electronic device. I was likewise prevented from contracting with any Sudanese for any service while in Sudan, and I agreed not to have contact with or interview specified government individuals. In the field, these limitations were challenging, but forced creative responses. I coped by borrowing laptops from generous acquaintances who became friends(*1), by using public internet cafes, by bringing mechanical, disposable cameras, and by seeking collaborators willing to assist me without formal contractual compensation.

I was questioned about my travel to Sudan at US and European airports, and was searched once in Boston Logan airport because I was carrying on my person all of the money I needed for my research due to the ban on the use of credit cards as part of an official no-interest Islamic banking and finance system. The majority of my entries and exits through the Khartoum airport searches were trouble free, and only once were two boxes of books searched and the contents questioned, mainly books in English about AIDS internationally and about women and development in Sudan. Research under the USIP auspices took place from January to May, 2007 and in December 2007 to January 2008. During this period it was my great pleasure to renew friendships and contacts at the Sudan Judiciary and at the universities, as well as among the center city shopkeepers and venerable Acropol and Sahara hotels. The women justices who have been my great friends and collaborators in past research were all still at their desks, despite journalistic and human rights reports of their having been summarily dismissed in a purge of female public employees during the early years of the Bashir regime. A multi-building Judicial complex has replaced the single colonial structure of the past, and several women judges were elevated to the national High Court during the NIF regime, and are now housed in its gleaming, new building, while of the women justices was made a presidential advisor.

Colleagues in the Departments of Anthropology, Political Science, and the College of Law at the University of Khartoum, at Juba, Ashfād, and Nileen Universities, as well as the Sudanese Studies Center were—as they have always been—open, critical, and generous. Some queried what has been gained by the informal boycott by western researchers (with the exception of archaeologists) that isolated scholars in Sudan and did little to isolate the regime. As a returning Arab speaking foreigner well-acquainted with Sudan, I was interviewed by the electronic and print media generally curious about my long experience in the country, but also eager to engage me in critical political discourse, especially related to the politicization of Shari‘a and Islam. My meetings with Sudanese youth from multiple backgrounds were both planned and spontaneous. These were filled with surprise and delight. I found them politically sharp, engaged with global culture, and culturally rebellious, despite decades of war and repression.

Among entrenched Islamist functionaries with whom I was not previously acquainted, I was held with a mixture of curiosity, suspicion, and mistrust. Whereas in the past access to courts and observation of cases was open without formal permission, during this period of research such access required written permission, or high level verbal approval. In one case, I was admonished by a high level administrator in the Judiciary about the “agendas” of westerners—who I presumed to be human rights investigators—coming to Sudan and documenting their version of the “truth” irrespective of the facts. In some cases barriers and difficulties were erected such that permission to observe court sessions was effectively denied. This occurred despite my habit of carrying and often giving the Arabic translation of my study of Shari‘a (*2) that I used as a credentialing device demonstrating my longstanding interest in the law. The book is now on sale in the major bookshops of Khartoum and is being read and assessed for the first time by scholars and jurists. Gauging the reception of this work—a study of Shari‘a prior to Islamization in 1983 with Grand Qadi Mohamed al-Gizouli who was out of favor with the judicial extremists led by Hasan al-Turabi—was not always possible. Now generally rehabilitated Sheik al-Gizouli can be appreciated as closer to the norm of Sudanese legal thinking than the extremists who followed him. A broad spectrum of readers from Islamists to secularists have received the book favorably, commenting most frequently about its objectivity. I interpret this as having, perhaps, an element of surprise that a non-Muslim expatriate could or would carry out such a study. Beyond the local context, it remains a serious question as to how a western, non-Muslim woman can adequately carry out research on the complexities of Islamic law. I keenly feel this very inadequacy at times. I recall a remark that I overheard when lecturing in Arabic to a generally skeptical class of anthropology students at the University of Khartoum who were reading my book for their course. When I mentioned that I take my American students to visit local mosques for Friday prayers once or twice during a semester, I noticed their surprise and overheard “ma batāl”—‘not bad’—from one of the students in the front row. It is well to recall that prejudice and misunderstanding is a two-way street.

Globalization of research:

In the current globalized world, is it possible to speak only for and to national groups of researchers? We are increasingly members of globalized professions by virtue of common disciplines and a transformed context of research in the international arena? Should not global research be met by global ethics, and include a vigorous discussion and debate of what are our universal standards of ethical conduct.

Anthropologists have engaged with the discourse on global human rights and have helped to shape emerging standards and how they might impact anthropological research. But, this discourse has not reached any consensus in anthropology as to what, if any, global standards exist in our culturally relative world view. I have argued that human rights advocacy is a moral choice but not an ethical imperative (Anthropology News, October 2006). Other professions have attempted to reach this sort of consensus, such as the American Psychology Association and their Task Force on National Security (2005), and they could not reach any consensus on what are universal human rights standards and thus their role in their code of ethics. Lacking national, not to mention global, consensus on matters of professionalism and ethics, the current era of globalization and professional ethics means that researchers must first and foremost be educated about the complex realities of global research and be prepared to negotiate resulting ethical responsibilities and competing interests among local, national, and global forces. This is much easier said than done, and requires continuous consideration of the implications of all acts of research and their local and global responses.
Collaborative Research

Participatory-Collaborative research is acknowledged as having been derived from feminist research that developed modified, or non-hierarchical methods for their research. The premises for this approach to research involve consultation with and incorporation of the research population into the research design, the methodology, and the outcomes of research. Some who follow this method do not publish their work until it has been read and critiqued by the research participants. Taken to its logical end, the lines between researcher and researched are ideally minimized. Diverse Sudanese cultures generally extend hospitality and openness to foreign researchers, thus making the two Sudans mostly a comfortable place to conduct research. It can be less so for indigenous researchers if their subject of interest appears to threaten the government. Of course there are likely exceptions to this generality, but the informal boycott by foreign researchers during the period from 1989 to the CPA isolated local scholars and kept Sudan specialists away from the country. The South benefited relatively speaking with younger scholars, local and international, taking advantage of the peace accords and access after the CPA in 2005.

Research with, rather than upon peoples takes the discourse on ethics, research, and practice into potentially historic new directions. Collaborative researchers may seek to “do some good” in their academic research or in the governmental and non-governmental organizations with whom they work and in the research topics they select.

The collaborative model of research involves the people studied in an active way—as individuals or as a group—with a vested interest in participating in the study. Community or individual involvement in the progress of research, thus designed, becomes a condition for its success, not simply a fortuitous by-product of work with communities. The collaborative model may presume a literate, conscious community of participants who may read and critique drafts of works intended for publication, but accommodation for non-literate participants can always be made using the Sudans’ considerable oral traditions.

Collaborative research is not only more ethically conscious and proactive, but this approach is also likely to yield better findings and overall research results. Proposed stages of ethical engagement in research: STAGE I: Introductions

- Transparent initial introductions with clear statement in appropriate language of:
- (1) research question(s) (2) methods to be employed (3) initial informed consent, but kept open as an evolving process (4) funding source(s)
- honest conversations about potential go/no go zones; appropriate dress (e.g. hijab), good times for appointments; visits; observation of public behavior

Stage II. Reciprocity & Information Sharing

- Deepening conversations about research subject; mutual information sharing
- e.g. discussion of reasons for increasing divorce rates; ‘irregular’ marriages (‘urf, temporary unions of younger women); arranging formal or informal focus groups;
- exploration of areas of potential collaboration and sharing; reciprocal sharing of language skills

Stage III: Collaboration and possible partnerships

- shared research, analysis, public presentations, and jointly authored publications (Collaborative Anthropology)
- Bilingual translation of useful documents, local & international distribution & exposure
- Personal case: US/OFAC sanctions and necessity of creative collaboration in a state considered an international pariah

Stage IV: Skills Sharing

- Skills sharing in bilingual online texts; computer access and useful internet websites; cultural sharing of local and global music; intercultural preparation and sharing of food & communal meals;
- Creative ways to try to equalize what can be a fundamentally unequal relationship; avoids pitfalls of paying “informants”; co-authorship of published work

The rules are the same for long-term and short-term relationships, but the stages will vary:

- Short-term surveys/interviews and the sharing of results is good practice
- mutual respect for differences in translation (Aslama/Islamiyya)
- Analysis of one’s research findings with faithful representation of cross-cultural differences in points of view (e.g. FGM, female circumcision)

Besides the above a researcher can voluntarily and selectively participate in public forums, for example one that I was invited to address “Democracy and Civil Society and the future of Shari’a.” Maintaining respectful dialogue with professionals and practitioners is vital. I have nurtured personal and professional ties, including long-term friendships with Sudan’s women judges that have enriched my life immensely. This has involved working within strongly gendered relationships in the Sudan within a context of mutual respect that relax, evolve, and yield unexpected rich outcomes over the years.

Finally, your books often remain obscure, but experience has taught that they should last longer than one anthropologist-researcher’s life.

Notes:

1. I express most sincere gratitude to Dr. Osman Mohamed Osman and Wendy Wallace for their occasional, generous loan of their personal laptop computers.

Works by the author cited:


Book Reviews

_A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts_ by James Copnall

_Sudan and South Sudan’s Bitter and Incomplete Divorce_

_Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan_ by Harry Verhoeven

_Naseem Badley_ The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction

_Land, Urban Development and State-building in Juba, Southern Sudan_
This extensive volume consists of one introduction and seventeen papers, nearly all of them presented at the Golden Jubilee of the Anthropology Department at the University of Khartoum in 2008 and thereby predating the separation of the country in 2011. Authors cover Sudanese, British, French, American, German, and Norwegian anthropologists all of whom have or had close connections to the Anthropology Department at the University of Khartoum. Especially the Norwegian contingent is prominent as there was a nearly continuous relationship between the anthropology departments of the Universities of Bergen and Khartoum. The topics deal with anthropology, social anthropology and political anthropology. A recurring theme is the inter-dependence between anthropology and the institutions that finance them, especially in the case of development and aid agencies. In the following I present an overview and a few examples chosen from each chapter.

The introduction describes the history of the Anthropology Department at the University of Khartoum founded in 1958, just after Sudanese independence, when the teaching staff was very international. However, anthropology in the Sudan is older than the Anthropology Department having seriously started with Charles Seligman’s work in 1910. From 1970 onwards Sudanese returning from overseas took over most of the lecturing.

Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed writes about “The state of anthropology in the Sudan” (p. 21 ff). In the past “Expatriate government and expatriate anthropologists” (p. 23) were crucial, nowadays “Indigenous anthropologists and expatriate consultants” (p. 28). Since the beginning methodologically there was a “shift from participant observation to participant intervention” (p. 30), raising the issues of commitment of the researcher, ethics, ideology, and nation-building. He writes critically: “Most visiting anthropologists of this period fall into two categories: students who come to do “exotic” fieldwork and at the same time assume the role of advisors; and professional anthropologists who came as “experts” even if they have never been to the Sudan before.” In order to avoid that kind of “scientific colonialism” (p. 30) each expatriate should demonstrate why (s)he should go to the Sudan.

Gunnar Haaland’s “Rethinking ethnicity: From Darfur to China and back - small events, big contexts” (p. 37 ff) starts the articles authored by anthropologists from Bergen. Already in the 1960s he observed “that about every year about 1% of sedentary Fur cultivators left the village and established themselves in migratory camps living like the Baggara and behaving like them.” (p. 39) That led him to be event-focused and taking ethnic variation seriously in anthropology; a method later applied in his research in different Asian countries.

Wendy James in “Strategic movement: A key theme in Sudan anthropology” (p. 55 ff) talks about people’s movements and people’s homes: One example concerns the West African pilgrims on their way to Mecca who settled in the Sudan. In James’ eyes that is a myth as “the Condominium regime positively encouraged the settlement of immigrants from West Africa because of the shortage of agricultural labor in connection with economic development projects.” (p. 61) She applies her historical findings to recent movements of people in southern Sudan and Darfur. Such movements make “the Malinowskian” style of intensive fieldwork in one place, the cultivation of personal friendships in the field and the gaining of trust for writing accounts of truthful and lasting quality” (p. 64) nearly impossible.

Fahima Zahir El-Sadaty writes about “Urbanisation and Social Change in the Sudan” (p. 69 ff), starting with the history of African urbanization in the 19th century “through the penetration of foreign capital” (p. 72). That began a process leading to a dichotomy of periphery (or rural areas) and core (or state capital) with its extensive lower-class housing areas, both of which are also typical of the Sudan.

Idris Salim El-Hassan in his paper “Old Omdurman and national integration: The socio-historical roots of social exclusion” (p. 81 ff) shows that the integration of newcomers to Old Omdurman has not worked, thereby denying the assumption that Omdurman’s social model can be a blueprint for the whole country. Another topic is the ambivalent attitude towards women in Old Omdurman: while after the Mahdiya women’s status was at a peak due to many of them becoming heads of households and since then have been highly respected, there is also a tendency to regard them as “weak creatures … whose protection lies with the men.” (p.87)

Gunnar M. Sorbø’s in “Anthropology and peacebuilding in Sudan – some reflections” (p. 95 ff) looks at mechanisms for peace, acknowledging that where feuds are inherent in culture (as among the Nuer) one better aims for “conflict transformation” rather than for “conflict resolution” (p. 96). In the Sudan, he recommends change and peace building bottom-up from the local level: “…the outcomes on key measures of human development in Sudan’s disadvantaged regions rank among the lowest in the world, while Khartoum and some northern states along the Nile show performance well above sub-Saharan average.” (p. 99) Sorbø concludes with three recommendations for anthropologists. They should contribute to the process of peacebuilding by looking at “the relationship between power, profit, and politics, including the role of international connections” (p. 106), peacekeeping operations and their effects “on conflict transformation as well as markets,
local communities, political development” (p. 106), and a post-conflict peacebuilding frame that regards local conflict resolution as relevant.

Pivotal to Barbara Casciarri’s paper “The predicament of access to, and management of resources in globalized Sudan: Some notes on Arab pastoralists in the Butana and Southern Kordofan” (p. 111 ff) is the term “desocialisation.” Former shared values of “mutual aid and collective work, the principle of free water” (p. 119), and “gabila as a social unity” (p. 121) have been disintegrated through the “impact of the dynamics of globalisation – liberalisation, land grabbing, growing market processes” (p. 126) and disrupted pastoral societies. In conclusion, Casciarri recommends to going “back to being ‘concerned anthropologists’.” (p. 135)

Leif Manger in “Conflicts on the move – looking at the complexity of the so-called ‘resource-based conflicts’” (p. 139 ff) in Western Sudan” exemplifies resource-based conflicts on the Hawazma nomadic group which moved between western Sudan and the Upper Nile region. For Manger, the period of Native Administration leaders “represents a flourishing of pastoral development in the central rangelands in the Sudan”. (p. 154) In contrast, “[w]ith the current regime taking power in 1989, … there is considerable institutional chaos as far as dealing with resource management … Schemes have blocked pastoralists and taken land from local cultivators.” (p. 155) Manger especially blames privatization and land grabbing which has undermined the legitimacy of the state and changed its role from resource management to conflict management. (p. 158+159) His outlook is bleak: “There is not much hope in the situation in Western Sudan for a process that might facilitate development.” (p. 159)

Munzoul A. M. Assal, one of the editors of the volume, writes about “A Sudanese anthropologist doing fieldwork in Norway: Some critical reflections”. (p. 163 ff) While mostly western anthropologists research societies in non-western countries this article changes the outlook from the Sudan to Norway. For some western academicians it took time to accept a non-westerner doing research on their own turf. Assal closes his article with a very positive tribute to Leif Manger highlighting the importance of anthropologists to get involved: “We academics often are in the sidelines even though the knowledge we produce is vital and can save lives.” (p. 174)

Ahmed Al-Shahi deals with “Pluralism and governance in Sudan: Reflections on the local and national perspective”. (p. 179 ff) Many Sudanese in particular regard “social relationships … first and political differences second” (p. 181) as the book reviewer confirms. So there is some opportunity for cooperation and tolerance. Unfortunately, “successive democratic and military governments have not been successful in developing alternative viable systems that would lessen the significance of, and reliance on, ethnic, religious and tribal loyalties.” (p. 182)

The late Jay O’Brien writes about “Identity conflicts and culture concepts: Insights from Sudan.” (p. 191 ff) looking especially at the ongoing Arab / non-Arab dichotomy in the country and how globalization is impacting it.

Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, the other editor, looks at “From Native Administration to Native System: the reproduction of a colonial model of governance in post-independence Sudan” (p. 223 ff) presenting many detailed insights.

Osman Mohamed Osman Ali gives an overview about “Anthropological studies on religion in Sudan” (p. 235 ff) covering the Anglo-Egyptian period to the post-independence period. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban’s “Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan” from 1979 is still considered as unique. (p. 243) While most of the studies mentioned deal with Islam, any anthropological research on Christianity in the Sudan is missing.

Sondra Hale in her paper “Gendering the politics of memory: Women, identity, and conflict in Sudan” (p. 247 ff) looks at the development of a collective memory, and the creation of a former homeland among refugee women applying a post-colonial framework.

Ellen Gruenbaum deals with health services and other health issues in “From ‘harmful traditions’ to ‘pathologies of power’: Re-vamping the anthropology of health in Sudan”. (p. 263 ff) The presentation of a paper on Female Circumcision in the Gezira in 1979 made Gruenbaum famous. Nowadays she looks at the power issues that are behind health issues: “Building palaces of wealth instead of gardens of well-being in the communities leaves misery in its wake.” (p. 271)

Enrico Ille’s “Historical thinking in political discourses: The case of land issues in South Kordofan” (p. 277 ff) exemplifies the topic at (Tira) Mandi, a village in the east of South Kordofan. Depending on one’s view of history and of the first-comers to the area, (Tira) Mandi is a Tira or an Arab village. However, there may have also been different villages in the area that were summarized as ‘Mandi’ with one of them ‘Tira Mandi’. The result is an “inner split of the [(Tira) Mandi] village along the Tira-SPLM / Shawâbna-NCP lines” (p. 284) complicated by outsiders coming from Khartoum installing their own head and a change in the system of Native Administration by the Khartoum government. The micro-cosmos of (Tira) Mandi is a blueprint of what can be expected in any peace process regarding Abyei or the Nuba Mountains.

The final paper by Abdalla Mohamed Gasimelseed Re-thinking livelihoods in the Gezira Scheme: A study of the Al-Takala village” (p. 291 ff) is a thorough analysis of the village Al-Takala, its households, and its means of livelihoods. Sharecropping is widely applied. Villagers have experienced profound change: “While [the citizens] previously worked as agricultural laborers, they are now investors or money-lenders using the money they get from their migrant sons and husbands. … Elders no longer enjoy economic and social control.” (p. 296) Local income for most villagers is insufficient to cover basic food commodities and other basic needs. It is even more lowered through “moneylenders [who] by and large determine the crop to be produced before sowing and its price even before harvest time”. (p. 307) In this context Gasimelseed criticizes the NIF privatization and new Zakat policies (p. 306) that mainly empower “youth and women who back the NIF, excluding all others” (p. 296) economically, destabilizing the village structure even further.

The different papers added together show the absence of one anthropological topic: Sudanese Christianity, past or present. Jay Spaulding (p.c.) adds accordingly: “[I]n fact, in my view, that should be equal in significance to the anti-imperialist critique that seems to figure prominently in this volume. What people believe matters.”

Hopefully, the overview and few quotes encourage the reader to obtain the book and read the chapters of one’s interest completely. The reader is awarded with wonderful insights, not just about the research done at the Anthropology Department at the University of Khartoum but also, due to the Department’s international connections, about the development of anthropology during the last fifty years. It offers a sound foundation for any future anthropological research in the Sudan. Currently, the volume is available to scholars who are out-of-reach of academic libraries and can be downloaded at no cost from:
Periodically a volume is written that immerses the reader into the story to the point where the characters, storylines, and themes become alive and vibrant. The knowledge gleaned and insights shared are so woven into the writing that we are finished with the book and realize we’ve just received a monumental education.

James Copnall’s A Poisonous Thorn In Our Hearts is just such a publication. An acclaimed BBC writer and multi-decade resident/student of the Sudan, he transports us into the eyes, hearts, and minds of the two Sudans, through the experiences of international businessmen and tea sellers. We are taken down the path of independence of South Sudan from its historically attached northern portion. He leaves no stone unturned or any topical discussion incomplete. Blending his years of living in Sudan and the associations he was able to leverage, we are drawn through the generations of struggle, politically, militarily, and economically, that produced a greater Sudan; and a divided Sudan, and drew light on such traumatic events as the violence in Darfur; the sudden motherlode of wealth due to oil, and the just as quickly removed access to that single cash commodity. He adroitly weaves in intra-State rivalry and violence, as well as internecine warfare, within each of the Sudans, along Equatoria and Abyei, and spilling over into Darfur.

This writing is an eminently readable primer for the serious student of African and Sudanese history, culture, politics and state formation/dissolution/re-formation, as well as the casual reader familiar with the media and political attention heaped upon Darfur and Bashir’s “sheltering” of Osama Bin Laden. Both ends of the spectrum will find this to be a single source of reference that assuages their hunger, or tempts their senses to further delve into any of a number of specific topics, for further research.

All writers have to make compromise in how they structure writing. In Mr. Copnall’s case, he has chosen a categorization of topics that allow for one chapter to look at both, or all sides, of a particular situation. Case in point is Chapter 1, People and Identity. We meet Mustafa Khogali, a wealthy and well connected businessman from Khartoum. An oil magnate, entrepreneur, mobile phone networker, musician and editor, epitomizes all that can be in either of the Sudans. He laments, throughout the book, the wasted opportunities and challenges that lay ahead for Sudan, north and south, east and west, to work through its struggles. Of note, he also serves as a non-aligned presence. He considers himself Sudanese, although he has royal lineage and is one of the three larger and more powerful tribes in Sudan. He is a Sudanese businessman, first, last and always.

Sheikh Yagout Sheikh Mohamed Sheikh Malik Sheikh al Imam, a moderate presence along the White Nile, living out his days in the town they have named for him, and serving as a beacon for balance in this all too often black-white, Sufi-Salafist, Christian-Muslim, world. He replaced his father as the local Imam, upon the passing of the elder, and has established a following that draws the devout in from throughout the region. He reflects the scholar-priest; his only focus is on teaching Islam and how to practice it. He provides narrative throughout the story reflecting the ability of those in power to use their influence for the benefit of all; not just those of a certain tribe or social class.

Hawa Ibrahim Mohamed Khalifa, a Fur tea seller. We follow her story throughout as her land, Darfur, a land of which she proudly proclaims is named after her people, is trampled by competing tribes and interests, and results in her personally feeling the impact of warfare wrought by outside entities, within her land. She lives day to day and has buried family and friends. Her presence reflects the millions of disadvantaged and displaced, as they struggle to survive and make enough money to cloth, feed, and educate their children, to avoid a repeat of their elder’s circumstances of being embroiled in constant conflict.

We are introduced to the racial and social pecking order as Sudan bears all too familiar, the resemblance to any nation inhabited by relocated, self-proclaimed, indigenous, and hereditary cultures, tribes, and people. We find out that tribal origin can be as vindictive and suppressive in Sudan as skin tone, State of origin, and family name carry in many parts of the world.

Politics in Sudan has so many layers that even James Copnall’s fabulous writing can’t ultimately explore each of them to the level they would require, if one were to truly get to the bottom of what keeps Sudan spinning rather than progressing. He does an admirable job, however, of encapsulating the origins, ascendance to power, methods for staying in power, and exit strategies for those in positions of leadership to move on and those on the periphery, to step in. Nothing about Sudanese politics is clean. Case in point being the rise of Omar el Bashir. He was a well-trained, highly intelligent paratrooper who fought with distinction, with the Egyptians, against the Israelis. He was from one of the three tribes surrounding Khartoum, so he had the pedigree. He was a leader with vision and sought out as the face of the coup that ousted Sadig al Mahdi in 1999. What is revealed about his character and temperament is a complex and contradictory man who will turn on his benefactors, Hassan al Turabi yet can tell the odd dirty joke and demonstrates the cunning to do all that is required to remain in
power. He is easily vilified and is the only sitting President to be indicted by the International Criminal Court. Yet, his magnetism is portrayed in the ambivalence of his African neighbors to detain him until the ICC can send a team to pick him up and the rampant enthusiasm for him at all gatherings.

I recall vividly the indictments by the ICC and how the world hailed this as a monumental event. Yet, he’s still at large, in plain sight and running his country, and I found myself asking as to what extent the charges of crimes against humanity and genocide were substantive. The facts of the matter in terms of forces employed, both directly supported by Khartoum as well as outside agencies; the violence imposed on the enemies and more so, the civilian population and the savage destruction of the landscape and few towns are without question. What I began to question was the validity of laying claim that he was genocidal, when the style of warfare practiced in Darfur was as much a bloody civil and micro-world war, as it was a race to extinguish the Fur people.

I really enjoyed how James Copnall avoided running into the easy traps of over labeling and under explaining. He takes aim at John Garang, Salva Kiir, and Riek Machar as well. They are by no means without blood on their hands and money in their pockets. As seminal figures in the fight for independence, their own politics of power and purpose are well explored. John Garang, the idealist, ironically, or coincidentally, killed just months after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed; Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, Dinka and Nuer, forced to work together to build their new country, even though they’d fought against each other in the earlier civil war, and reflected the distrust of their tribes, even as they sought to build a new South Sudan.

The power brokers behind the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) are introduced as they play central roles in both nations’ past separation political and military engagements are explored a bit and the underlying tensions among members from both parties are brought to the surface. We are introduced to “The Minister” who is part of Bashir’s cabinet and a man on the inside of the NCP who is willing, akin to the Watergate “Deep Throat” source, to share with Mr. Copnall some of the inner workings, squabbles, and true feelings of those among the NCP and Sudanese power brokers in general. The Minister helps to balance the oft voiced North versus South arguments regarding who is the instigator and who is the victim.

Economics are thoroughly explored and double back around to that often malignized resource of oil. While oil, its extraction and value to the Sudanese economy, to the tune of over 4 billion dollars a year, is well explained, he goes out of his way to amplify the primacy of agriculture before oil was exploited, and well after the Sudanese reserves are gone. Embedded in the economics discussion is the impact of the Merowe Dam project and its impact on those who lived in what is now a basin covered by water.

He very pointedly highlights the impact of the separation of States as it demonstrates the interconnectedness of nations and peoples. Those with the means of acquisition are still dependent upon those with the means of transportation. In this case, northern Sudan used its pipelines as leverage to seek more revenue from the oil producing south. Once Khartoum saw 75% of their income dissipate they determined that war was a price to pay to extract more income from the South. War they received and international intervention became necessary.

Now, both sides have discovered the impact of relying solely on oil to build up their infrastructure and generate social programs. James Copnall nicely polishes off the chapter with a discussion of how both Sudans can expand their economic base, ironically relying upon agricultural and cash crops that fed them for hundreds of years.

Development takes economics down a different path. All the money that has been pumped into the larger Sudanese economy and population has netted so few gains. With both sides expending in the mid 40 percentage points of each dollar received on military forces, he highlights the challenge in developing a nation when the only development involves camouflage uniforms, semi-automatic weapons even a child can use, and aircraft and artillery that become Pavlovian terror events for the citizens on the receiving end of their deliveries. Corruption is as rampant in Sudan as any other country in the world. For all of the idealism of John Garang, and the efforts by the SPLA to forge their own nation, their current leadership has created a similar check valve on the trickle of internationally provided funds and oil revenues, down to the local State and community level.

One particularly sad vignette highlights the impact of so much money poured on the fire of nation state development in such a short time. An audit from 2007-8 reflected that the salaries of 855 teachers were consumed by the Minister of Educations “weekend allowance.” While this story isn’t unique, it highlights the disparity in how difficult it can be for a nascent State to develop into a properly functioning, appropriately focused, central government that uses their newly found independence and economic wealth for the benefit of the citizenry. Mr. Copnall highlights how the search for gold in South Sudan is supplanting labor efforts in rice, gum Arabic, and other arable crops that have been, or could be, staples of an ongoing economy. The relatively quick returns on investment make gold attractive and stable compared to the fluctuation associated with paper money, both south and north.

Insecurity comes into play, and we are reintroduced to such characters as Hawa Ibrahim Mohamed Khalifa, the Fur tea seller, and Nagwa Musa Konda, a development worker focused in the Nubian Mountains. Both tell, or retell tales of the tragedies and suffering of those caught in the multitude of crossfires. We are introduced further to fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The desire by Abyei to forge an identity; the rampant upheaval as both Juba and Khartoum seek to control contested areas transcending both nations, as well as the mess that was Darfur. The impotence of the UN Mission to Southern Sudan is discussed, especially as they are with a mandate to act if lives are threatened, yet their recurrent unwillingness to do so. Mr. Copnall meticulously weaves the challenges of trying to develop nations when various alliances use proxy rebel groups to do their bidding, while engaging in concurrent fights in neighboring countries. Case in point being the Khartoum government support to the South Sudan Liberation Army that was stirring trouble in Juba, and Juba’s support to the SPLM-North, which was subsisting on violence in and around Khartoum and Omdurman.

Adding to the chaos were allegations of Hasan Turabi’s influence being at play with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and their efforts at tipping the apple cart of power in Khartoum. Mr. Copnall’s stories all take on the overtone of a pride of Lions and a cackle of hyenas all converging on a fresh kill. While on the surface both groups have a common end state in mind; obtaining a meal, underneath that veneer of cooperation lies the individual motivation to not go hungry, regardless of the personal cost.

Mr. Copnall wraps up his intriguing novel cum anthology of all that has been and may be of Sudan,
with two chapters that highlight the worldview of both Sudans, and their role in becoming partners on the international stage, and then a more intimate look at what really has occurred with the separation of Sudan and Southern Sudan; generational alliances and inter-marriage, for instance Dinka and Makki, one southern and the other from the north, and how this tear in the fabric of what was one nation has cut down to the emotional and family bone.

James Copnall doesn’t have all the answers to what ails the Sudans, nor does he explore every possible angle that forged what we have today and what may come tomorrow. When you want to go to one place and feel that the result of your efforts in reading about the Sudan situation has justified the time spent, I am unaware of any other so superbly written and easily digested, single entry in the vast and superlative landscape of Sudanese literature.

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The Miracle of Saint Mina
ElShafie ElGazuuli and van Gerven Oei
Translated into Dongolawi-Andaandi and English by Den Haag

Review by Intisar Saghyoon

The book contains of 157 pages including the bibliography. The Old Nubian text telling the story of the Miracle of the Coptic Saint Mina is about 23 pages, the grammatical commentary 70 pages, and the grammatical analysis of the Andaandi translation 27 pages. The introductory pages from vii-xvii include preface, a map and explanatory notes.

The story is about a miracle by Saint Mina which led a whole family and their servants to adopt Christianity. It starts with a rich barren woman who lives in a village in the district of Alexandria, Egypt, who heard about the miracles performed by Saint Mina. Since she is barren as well as her servants, animals and fowls, so she decides to try out the story of miracles first on her fowl and she promises to send the eggs to a church. The second main part of the episode is about the sailor who is supposed to deliver the eggs to the church. The woman takes the eggs to the riverside where she finds the sailor who promises to take the eggs to the church of St. Mina in Mareotes. In this part the women declares that if St. Mina makes her pregnant she will become a Christian. The sailor forgets about the eggs and at some point he even cooks and eats them. Three months later on a Sunday, he arrives at a village and goes into a church to worship. Here another miracle happens: he sees St. Mina riding on a white horse, holding his spear and rushing towards him. The terrified sailor takes refuge in the image of the Virgin Mary. Despite that the Saint strikes him with his spear on the head. At this moment, the eggs he ate come out, but as a fowl, which the saint takes and then departs. Then the saint goes to the woman’s house and gives her the fowl to put among her other fowls to give birth. The woman is told that she is going to bear a son that she shall call Mina. The story continues with finally the whole family embracing the Christian faith and becoming sincere servants of the church of St. Mina. This is a very important book as there are not many published books like this available. While it is not the first publication of the Old Nubian St. Mina story, for the very first time a complete Old Nubian text is introduced to readers of Dongolawi Nubian. When he saw the book Professor Ali Osman commented that as far as he is aware this is the very first document written in Dongolawi using the Old Nubian alphabet. Usually formal documents, royal decrees, letters, business (trade) transactions, conveyance, religious texts written in the Old Nubian alphabet are compared with Mahas Nubian (Nobiin), as most of the documents we have dealt with and still dealing with so far, originate from the area of Nobatia further north of Dongola. So it has been assumed that the formal language as well as the religious language was close to Nobiin.

The layout of the book starting from formatting and character set, namely the Old Nubian characters, is perfect. The idea of introducing the Old Nubian alphabet with added examples in the preface is excellent. The story as well as the translation are fitting for the purpose. Ali Osman considers it the most perfect list of the Old Nubian alphabet he knows, which he will be using henceforth in his lectures.

Dongolawi is a living language, it is the most widely spoken Nubian language, and there is language contact and change. Therefore words tend to develop new meanings. Many efforts have been made to go beyond the surface meaning to discover the deeper religious meaning of words. In Ali Osman’s words: “The translation of the document into Dongolawi is to the point. In Nubian languages words tends to have many meanings. For example the word ‘nicci’ means in modern day Nubian ‘clouds’, in religious texts it means ‘heaven’. It is very difficult for modern Nubian speakers to find and understand the religious meaning of such words. In the book of Revelation 14 from the Bible angels are coming down from heaven through clouds. Here the word ‘nicci’ appears clearly meaning ‘heaven’.”

It is also important to connect the Old Nubian heritage with the Dongolawi Nubian population. The number of churches that have been discovered in Old Dongola, the capital of Markuria, and its adjacent cities, the richness of the frescoes and paintings, and the inscriptions in the Old Nubian script are not known in the south (Alwa region). The relationship between the Old Nubian heritage and the Old Nubian language will influence our scholarly interpretation of archaeological sites. It also gives Sudanese archaeologists a broader idea what to look for when doing archaeology and reading the stories of the Coptic saints, and considering the Coptic language in the surrounding areas (a kind of inductive approach). Many archaeologists and researchers of medieval Sudanese Christian history have been saying and writing, that Christianity among Nubians was practiced in a superficial way. Definitely it was not. This work provides a strong evidence.

The discovery of many monasteries in Old Dongola indicate the role played by monks in the spread of Christianity, the same role played by Sufi orders and its members in the Islamization of the Sudan in the post medieval period. Such a book will expand our knowledge of the socio-cultural aspects of Christian Nubia right into today’s Sudanese culture. The Christian remnants in present day Sudan are numerous, as can be observed in graveyards, visitation rites, in rites of passage. It is interesting to see the continuity of the role of the Christian priest in the story of St Mina by Sufi sheikhs and the belief in dead Sufi sheikhs’ miracles. Barren women go to sheikhs whether dead or alive, looking for their miracle, usually with their offerings, and they promise more if their wishes are fulfilled. Therefore, the book should put on the reading list of anybody studying the Nubian languages. Also researchers of Sudanese archaeology and modern-day Sudanese culture will benefit from it.

Intisar Saghyoon, lecturer in the department of Archaeology, University of Khartoum, Additional comments offered by Professor Ali Osman, a lecturer in Old Nubian at the Department of Archaeology, University of Khartoum.
Modern Sudan is one of the most interesting and complex political economies in Africa, if not the world. The formerly largest African nation state by territorial size has undergone a great deal of political and geographical transformation in the past thirty years making it a key political economy for anyone wanting to understand twenty-first century African politics. Harry Verhoeven has been a rising star amongst analysts of the Sudanese political economy in the past six to eight years. In addition, he writes fluently and provides original insights on the recent history of Sudan’s political and economic strategies. He explains Sudan through what he calls a “hydro-agricultural” lens, the formation of the Al-Inghaz regime’s version of modernity. Using Francois Molle’s term “hydrocrats” Verhoeven attempts to take a Wittfogel-esque perspective on nation building by the ruling Islamist Party in Sudan. He deserves praise for telling the story of Sudan from an unusual and useful perspective. The story sheds light on how the hydraulic mission of the post-1989 regime influenced the development of the Sudanese political economy. Underpinned by immense detail on how decision-making in modern Sudan works, Verhoeven contributes much new knowledge to Sudanese studies. His exceptional analysis on the futility of the misleading land grabbing discourse cannot be praised enough. It is here that the book is strongest as he deconstructs myths around the perception of the Sudanese “breadbasket” and how dams have served a political narrative that may be unsustainable in the end. Verhoeven also engages very effectively with the role of Sudanese farmers, which few authors have done to date.

His ambitious political analysis is, however, not without risks. He questions the economic usefulness of large-scale water infrastructure, but he does not situate the “hydro-agricultural” mission in an accessible context. He cannot be blamed for this outcome as so much has changed. But if he had written his magnum opum today, he would have found it uncomfortable getting the analysis to fit the new economic circumstances. Verhoeven’s research was largely conducted during the bullish international food commodity markets after 2008, which made the Al-Inghaz “hydro-agricultural” mission seem to be sustainable. Today, commodity markets are depressed and low prices prevail. The reader is prompted to ask the question - how can the current regime cope with these volatile political and economic circumstances? Has it not banked on the wrong policies and investments? The reader might conclude that the book requires a second edition, putting the mission of the Islamist hydrocrats in an informed historical perspective. Perhaps even from a viewpoint of failure.

At the same time, Verhoeven uses the term “global” in the context of Nile politics without actually providing a global analysis. Although he rightly explains the Gulf Arab influence, he unfortunately doesn’t provide a global analysis. This would have required an engagement with Sudanese agricultural trade and the persisting role of American corporates in this field.

Overall, Harry Verhoeven has compiled a compelling study on Sudan that deserves the label “seminal”. It is without question that his “Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan” is an essential read for students of modern Sudan. It is therefore a highly recommended acquisition for any librarian with responsibility for African affairs.

Prof. John Anthony Allan is an emeritus professor in geography at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and King’s College London. A pioneer in global water studies, he coined the term “virtual water” for which he was awarded the Stockholm World Water Prize in 2008. Dr Martin Keulertz is a research associate with the Texas A&M University Nexus research group.) describing a bureaucracy charged with water infrastructure and water governance.

The German American historian Wittfogel (1896–1988) described dictatorships whose power was based on controlling natural resources such as water.
In The State of Post-Conflict Reconstruction (2014), Naseem Badiey provides an excellent analysis of post-conflict state-building from the vantage of Juba during the first years of the Interim Period (2005-2011)*1. Despite considerable foreign aid and technical assistance (and a popular desire for improved housing), urban development in Juba had, after the CPA, become so encumbered by negotiation that it seemed to have come completely to a halt. Badiey describes how jurisdictions over the authority to allocate land and settle land issues were continually being renegotiated between leaders of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and Central Equatoria State (CES), while Bari residents of communally owned areas around the town resisted giving up their homesteads and farms for housing developments. Juba’s population steadily increased. Insecure land tenure discouraged investment in permanent buildings, since they might at any moment be condemned, and the city became increasingly ringed with ‘informal settlements’ of zinc sheds and wattle-and-daub houses with thatched roofs and dirt floors. The Sudan Tribune reported that “the relationship between the national government, the state and the host community has not been smooth since 2005” (ST 2011), and aid agency reports described Juba as “entirely dysfunctional and chaotic” (128). Exasperated SPLM officials and foreign consultants cited local resistance to urban development as evidence of pathology: backwardness, corruption, tribalism, and low capacity.

Badiey provides a critique of the dominant view, common among post-conflict interventionists, that you can build liberal democratic states more or less anywhere using the same formula. Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, Sri Lanka or Southern Sudan: each was conceived as a ‘blank slate’ wiped clean of social institutions and impediments to development by war or disaster. An idea as embedded in the structure of unequal global power relations as this, no matter how incorrect, takes a long time to dislodge. Thus, there is a popular misconception that post-conflict reconstruction is mainly a matter of ‘capacity building,’ solving technical problems, codifying indicators and writing up policy; set up accountable and transparent institutions under the guidance of foreign experts and a liberal democracy will take root. The often-repeated statement that “the” state failed in South Sudan is partly a result of this simplified plan colliding with a landscape of existing institutions.

Badiey approaches Juba, and Southern Sudan, as an existing institutional order with its own dynamics. By doing so, she is able to provide an alternative analysis of state-building and to introduce different perspectives on what appears to be its failure. This approach also opens up questions that are less about how Juba responded to ‘outside forces’ (international NGOs, for instance, rarely appear in this book) than about how people there renegotiated their relationships with each other and how reconstruction emerged from their resistance, negotiation, and cooperation. “Clearly,” Badiey says, “Juba was not a blank slate on which new institutions could be effortlessly created” (128). She rejects the opposition of state-building to conflict and disruption by examining the productivity of negotiations between competing interests formed at the junctures of land rights, tenure reform, and post-conflict urban development. Resistance to SPLM efforts to establish control over land allocation in Juba, for example, did not cut haphazardly and unpredictably across local interests and allegiances: “there was a clear logic to the way in which it operated,” Badiey writes (218), governed by the triangular relationships in Juba between GoSS and CES officials and Bari residents of the surrounding countryside. The book is oriented around the friction engendered by their competing claims to Juba. Badiey shows that their conflicts did not really have to do with ‘ethnic difference’ or, even, opposition to reconstruction so much as with resistance to reconstruction going forward without their involvement in shaping it. What their negotiations (over authority, resources and identity) reveal is how entangled these groups were in state-building—that is to say, in efforts to define, make use of, and place limits on institutions of coercion and authority. What appears to be dysfunction, Badiey ultimately shows, is the contested process of state construction itself.

The State of Post-Conflict Reconstruction consists of an
introductory chapter and a short concluding chapter, bookending five substantive chapters. In the first two chapters, Badiey describes how the experience under colonial rule and subsequent governments had a profound impact on the relation between “the state” and “local communities,” making “land and identity the focus of struggles over access to political and state resources” (26). Chapter One gives a history of state construction in Equatoria, beginning with the intense violence of the zara‘ib (slave) trade under Turco-Egyptian rule (1840-1888), which fostered the popular image of Government as something essentially foreign, violent, and predatory. Between the beginning of the last century—when the infrastructure of the slave-and-ivory trade was reworked into a system of “indirect rule” under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government (1889-1956)—and the signing of the CPA (2005) lies a century of negotiation. This history saw people finding ways to cope with changing forms of governance and land tenure, civil wars and the formation of the Southern Regional Government, the proliferation of militias and defense groups, and the isolation of Juba and other towns during their occupation by government forces. People across Southern Sudan developed new social relations, identities, and attachments to land in an effort to manage this situation. The same social dynamic that led to the “bargain” struck by Bari “cargo chiefs” more than a century ago—negotiating relationships of trade and interaction with foreign forces in exchange for benefits and protection—kept coming back, even if in different times and places the elements came together in different ways.

Decades of civil war had produced a checkerboard of ‘sub-state’ and localized groups in Southern Sudan. What it produced was not a vacant wasteland, a post-war landscape stripped of the social relations that stood in the way of housing developments and agricultural schemes but a region as enmeshed within networks of power, trade, and meaning as any other. “In order to emerge as a viable state,”—Badiey writes—“the SPLM leaders of GoSS had to reconcile the multiple identities, political systems, and spheres of law, which had been the product of years of war and multiple failed efforts at peace-making” (75). Decentralization was seen as a way to manage this situation. However, the CPA did not itself create a workable decentralized government. Doing that, Badiey writes, “requires a great deal of negotiation” (86).

Chapter Two follows the complicated process of negotiation in Juba that emerged around efforts to figure out what integration and decentralization meant in actual practice. What this meant was transforming a rebel army into a national political party (SPLM), a professional army (SPLA), and a decentralized government (GoSS) of states divided up into counties, payams, and bomas, in rural parts of the country, and municipalities and town councils in urban areas. In former major towns it also meant integrating two major systems of governance that had existed side-by-side during Southern Sudan’s Second Civil War (1983–2005) when the Khartoum government controlled garri- son towns, and the SPLM/A controlled minor towns and much of the southern countryside. In Juba, the SPLM leadership of GoSS found themselves at odds with the CES Government and the “Bari community”—the first trying to maintain political jurisdiction over the city and to advance the meaningful devolution of power to the state level; the second, trying to hold on to control over the outlying countryside, so as to continue on managing their own lives. Indeed, the continual competition over jurisdictions between the CES Government and GoSS eventually culminated in competing claims to Juba town itself, with each proposing that the other pick up and relocate its capital elsewhere (98).

In offices in Juba these divisions coalesced especially around differing experiences of the war. The CES government was mostly staffed by Equatorian bureaucrats, who had worked in the Bahr el-Jebel state government in Juba under Sudan’s National Congress Party (NCP). Their SPLM counterparts, by contrast, had generally gained their experience in the military structure of the army. SPLM managers accused CES government employees of having made a business of collaborating with or informing for the SAF in Juba, where they had led cushy lives “inside” the town—while, “outside,” the SPLA had been fighting and suffering. CES civil servants responded that this was unfair: they had suffered under the SAF too. They in turn accused SPLM staff of incompetence since they generally had lower levels of formal education.

Chapter Three turns from the role played by integration and decentralization in the dynamics of interpersonal relations between CES government civil servants and their SPLM counterparts to differing interpretations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the phrase “the land belongs to the community.” The book’s central dynamic recurs: Bari community leaders invoked customary rights over “community land” in Juba by appealing to an idiom of ancestral land and local community ownership against what was seen to be an unpredictable and extractive state. This is not surprising; one effect of colonial and post-colonial rule was that this idiom of localized land ownership came to be seen as the only really “traditional” one. This domain of “customary laws and institutions” that had earlier emerged against external spheres of government now offered (and provided a model for) an alternative to the centralized framework of land rights characteristic of the GoSS reconstruction agenda. SPLM leaders justified centralization on the grounds that it was essential for GoSS (seen as representing the more encompassing interests of all of Southern Sudan’s communities) to manage development “for the betterment of the people” (120)*2. CES Government leaders argued, alternatively, that the CPA had placed land management under the ambit of the state government. From the perspective of Juba, and despite their differences on other issues, Bari and non-Bari CES Government leaders were aligned with the “Bari Community” in their attempt to resist the centralization of government authority to allocate and manage land under GoSS.

Being wholly dependent upon GoSS for funds and access to plans for Juba’s reconstruction, the CES Government could not afford to antagonize SPLM leaders too openly by impeding the gazetting of large tracts of land on the town’s peripheries. In Chapter Four, Badiey describes how CES Government bureaucrats developed a number of indirect techniques to resist GoSS attempts to establish control over land allocation and management in Juba. Badiey shows how certain forms of corruption (selling unofficially demarcated plots) and evasion (failing to show up for workshops, or resisting the computerization of land registries) protected elite investments in land and fit a larger CES Government effort to preserve economic and political control over Juba. “While not denying the questionable motives” (130), Badiey shows how, by placing small impediments in the way of centralization, CES Government bureaucrats endeavored to shape the process of reconstruction in Juba by working for meaningful decentralization and “keep[ing] the state out of the local sphere” (135). “What appears to be patronialism and corruption,” Badiey writes, “are often responses to the disruptions introduced by the process of state construction” (135).
Chapter Five turns from relations among state and local elites to ordinary people, in this case residents of two of Juba’s neighborhoods, Thongpiny and Gudele. In these neighborhoods, people drew on different conceptualizations of citizenship to make claims on land; despite the different sociological setting, their claims reveal a dynamic similar to the one structuring elite relations. To understand this, Badiey shows, one first has to understand how these perspectives are produced in relationship to specific histories and investments, through specific institutions, and in particular scales and geographic locales. Some were able to anchor their claims to land in Thongpiny on the basis of an ancestral identity when their position as land owners was jeopardized by housing developments and ‘land grabs’; others represented themselves as having purchased the right to the land by evoking commitments: the suffering they had endured staying there or the improvements that they had made. Still others saw citizenship and land rights as defined by the legal process of the state and mainly a matter of documentation. Ex-combatants who had resettled in Thongpiny tended to represent themselves as rising above the ethnolinguistic divisions in the country (used by long-term residents to assert their own claims) and appealing to a construction of citizenship rooted in military service, claiming citizenship on the basis of having fought to liberate the country. Everyone also seemed perfectly well of aware these different constructions were made available by the circumstances of particular locales.*3 People moved around quite a bit. Someone who had, in one place, drawn on a conception of citizenship rooted in an ancestral identity might appeal to a discourse of suffering or military service in another. This shifting back and forth between different perspectives allowed people to be continually aware of just how situational citizenship claims could be; no single construction of citizenship was final—all were at least potentially negotiable.

Badiey’s focus on Juba serves as a continual reminder of the specificity of place. Much of the writing on South Sudan (like the post-conflict planning literature she cites) portrays places the other way around: as featureless sites without any specific characteristics or histories upon which timeless “ethnic tensions” play out. (“Camp housing tens of thousands of internally displaced people reflects ethnic tensions in the country at large” [Moran 2015]). It is not only that images of IDP camps and a generic and remote rural landscape of exotic marriage practices and tribal warfare (Rolandsen and Breidid 2012) have occluded cities and towns, their complicated histories and the ways in which they are enmeshed in regional and state-level politics. Abstracted from specific histories and geographic scales and locales, the inference that the entire population of South Sudan is prone to periodic outbreaks of irrational ethnic violence is supplied by the imagery used to illustrate it. (“The men, women, and children, all members of the Shilluk ethnicity, held machetes and makeshift weapons like rusty spears and crude wooden batons wrapped with barbed wire” [ibid.]) It is not surprising to find this attitude among foreigners living behind walls and razor wire and constantly warned to be on guard against a hostile population; but it also belongs to a long tradition of colonialist propaganda supporting the claim “that the Southern Sudanese were incapable of meeting the challenges of the modern world” (Johnson 1981).

These is of course a literature on urban centers in what is today South Sudan, beginning with the anthropologist John Burton’s “small towns and social transformation in the Nilotic Sudan” (1988). Still, Richard Grant and Daniel Thompson were not really exaggerating when they wrote: “[t]here is no

scholarly literature on Juba’s urbanism” (Grant and Thompson 2013:221). There are many reasons for this. The substantial “gray literature” on topics related to Juba’s urbanization (gender, food security, land, and so forth) is piecemeal—made up of very sector-specific reports written in a technical language about aspects of projects undertaken by international organizations. Much of this writing is unpublished or difficult to obtain *4. (Grant and Thompson [2013] were the first to analyze it systematically.) A number of scholars (Naseem Badiey, Cherry Leonardi, Christian Doll, Nakao Shuichiro, Gabriella McMichael, Ulrike Schulz, et al.) are producing a growing body of work on Juba that examines the city as a particular social field shaped by history and local, regional, national, and global forces.

But what Badiey has produced is more than simply a more nuanced portrayal of Southern Sudan—though she does this too—and an excellent contribution to the literature on South Sudan. This book enters into a discussion about post-conflict state-building that has been going on across the region for a long time. Well-organized and clearly written and argued, Badiey has provided an historical account populated by mature political actors, whose motives and commitments take shape within specific historical institutions. Beyond the book’s obvious interest for scholars of South Sudan, one hopes that anyone with an interest in understanding state-building processes or post-conflict situations will read this book. It provides a superb analysis of Juba’s institutional order during the Interim Period, as well as an important analysis about what are often portrayed as the failures of South Sudanese and of state-building in South Sudan.

Footnotes

1. That is to say, between the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Republic of South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

2. Similar struggles have continued in post-independence South Sudan. In May of 2015, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan found itself on the opposite side of this sort of dynamic when the parliament passed a bill meant to register NGOs, and to make them more legible. NGO leaders, aiming to protect the status quo, essentially, claimed that the regulations could, by impeding humanitarian aid and human rights advocacy, have “catastrophic effects” for human lives. (“If the bill makes getting assistance to people harder rather than easier, it could cost lives at a time of tremendous suffering for South Sudanese communities” [NGO Forum 2015]) The Guardian ran a story with the headline “South Sudan risks ‘catastrophe’ with new aid agency law, warn NGOs” (Guardian 2015). An SPLM Member of Parliament, Samson Ezekial, replied, “As a new nation we are supposed to enact laws that govern all aspects of life in this country”(quoted in Patinkin 2015). Saying, in effect, “South Sudan is a sovereign country and has the right to make laws. You NGOs came here to do ‘state-building’—now you complain when we pass a law regulating one of our largest private employment sectors? Are you kidding!”

3. This was all very explicit. A statement released by the “Bari community in Khartoum” in December 2008, for instance, described how GoSS land grabs in the vicinity of Juba had caused Bari residents there to “forcefully embrace” ancestral identity, as opposed to “nationalism,” to defend claims to land there (see ST 2008).

4. This is why, for example, books about South
Sudan frequently cite reports “consulted in Pact Juba offices on 25 July 2006” (Leonardi 2013:1 fn.2).

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