Message from the Editors

This APSA Africa Workshop newsletter comes at a time when African universities are in the news. Patrick Awuah won a MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship for the work that he did in founding Ashesi University College in Ghana. The public saga between Drs. Mahmood Mamdani and Stella Nyanzi gripped the Ugandan nation. And South African students struggle for lower fees and better educational opportunities, demanding accountability from the governing ANC political party.

Meanwhile, the American Political Science Association is seeking to build upon the continent-based APSA Africa Workshops with new opportunities for partnership and collaboration.

It is in this context that the April 2016 issue focuses on the politics of higher education in Africa. In many ways, the challenges facing the higher education sector resemble broader struggles for social mobility, equitable distribution, and justice across the continent.

The challenges we outline in this symposium are particularly relevant to us in our daily lives. Many of us face these difficulties in our jobs, and they significantly impact our research output and salary structures. During our 2012 workshop in Botswana, these topics came up every day and we deliberated various ways to try to overcome—or at least deal with—the constraints we faced in our own profession. But we also shared success stories from our home countries and institutions. This issue provides an overview of some of the most important developments in higher education in Africa today.

We hope you enjoy the issue, and we wish you the best in the final stages of the academic year.

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APSA Africa Workshops: A Retrospective Appreciation

By Ira Katznelson, April 2016

In late August 2005, when I was the incoming president of the American Political Science Association, the organization’s elected Council authorized a study to inquire about the timing, goals, and instruments of a potential Africa initiative. Conversations I conducted in the months that followed with a wide range of scholars within and outside African higher education reinforced my sense that the moment was propitious to launch an annual series of workshops, each oriented to particular themes and methods that would aim to deepen knowledge and capacity for scholars at early career stages.

Once funding was secured from the Andrew W. Mellon foundation, active planning began that led to the launch of a robust program geared to assist in the development of a cohort of intellectual and institutional leaders for African political science. The means selected were those of intensive residential workshops for some 20-25 individuals lasting two to three weeks each with a carefully planned schedule of activities and interactions, with leaders from both Africa and the United States.

From the start, these gatherings were designed to cover the ‘state of the art’ regarding specific subjects, to widen the range of methodological tools with which participants were familiar, and to offer venues for the presentation and critique of their work in the hope of having positive impacts both on teaching and research.

The results exceeded expectations. Held, in sequence, starting in 2008, in Dakar, Accra, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Gaborone, Ouagadougou, Maputo, and once again in Nairobi, workshop topics have included political participation, elections, gender politics, ethnic political representation, local communities and the state, religion and politics, the politics of distribution, and violent conflict—each a fundamental subject. In all 230 persons have participated in these considerations, and an alumni network has been formed.

We are all indebted to the remarkable energy and leadership deployed by the program’s academic leaders, APSA staff, and foundation partners in realizing so tangibly and thoughtfully what once was only an idea married to anticipation.

A Note from APSA

I hope this message finds everyone well and enjoying the end of the semester. Thanks to Jeff and George for their work on this issue, as well as all those who contributed. I also want to thank everyone who completed the 8-year Alumni Survey we conducted earlier this year. In total, our response rate was 39%. A few early notes on the results of the survey are included in this newsletter; we plan on uploading a more thorough report to the website over the coming months.

One clear take away from the Alumni Survey was the high value placed on opportunities for academic networking. For anyone whose APSA membership has lapsed in recent years, APSA does offer a special “Targeted International Membership” rate for scholars based in non-OECD countries. This discounted rate includes full access to APSA Journals as well as discounted registration to the Annual Meeting. I also want to spotlight the African Politics Conference Group (an organized section of APSA) which is another great network and resource. APCG hosts panels at APSA as well as the International Studies Association and the African Studies Association, and is an incredibly supportive group of scholars. You can sign up to be a member of APCG at the same time as renewing your APSA membership.

As always, I encourage you to contribute to future newsletters through announcements, research submissions, and your feedback on how we can continue to improve this publication. I look forward to catching up with some of you at APSA’s Annual Meeting in Philadelphia this September. Best to all in the coming months and stay well!

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THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM

By George Bob-Milliar (2012) and Jeffrey W. Paller (2012)

The politics of African higher education is at the forefront of societal struggles across the continent. The saga in the offices of Makerere University in Uganda, where research fellow Dr. Stella Nyanzi stripped naked in protest of director Mahmood Mamdani’s decision to evict her from her office, has gripped the nation. The episode provides a glimpse into the forms of dissent and resistance, as well as shows how power is so hard to shake.

The #FeesMustFall protests in South Africa demonstrate how a social movement can spread across the nation, shedding light on problems that extend to government corruption and failures of economic policy. The protests seek to give voice to a constituency that has been left out of the decision-making process.

The rise of private universities counters Africa’s struggle to provide public services. Privatization is one strategy to deal with a growing shortage of colleges and universities (Varghese 2004). Visionary leaders have attempted to take the educational challenge into their own hands, exiting from the state to provide an educational alternative. While many such institutions fail to provide high quality education, some schools like Ashesi University College in Ghana and Benin’s African School of Economics offer innovative educational platforms. The success of this model could transform the African academy.

This symposium provides a small glimpse into the state of higher education in Africa. We suggest that the African academy is a microcosm for larger social struggles across the continent. In this series, we focus on three major aspects of the challenge: protest and resistance, the non-state provision of education, and the politics of knowledge production.

In this introduction, we outline what is at stake in the politics of African higher education. Sean Jacobs of the New School then argues that the student protests in South Africa represent a potential challenge to the governing ANC by a minority coalition—mostly black students who make up a small fraction of the South African population. Finally, Kajsa Hallberg Adu of Ashesi University College suggests that private universities can provide access to quality education, but they are still reliant on the broader public education sector in order to make transformative change.

The state of higher education in Africa

Africa faces severe challenges in higher education in terms of quality, access, and capacity. But it also sits at an ideological crossroads, where the study of Africa—which is central to a university’s commitment to knowledge production—is heavily debated.

Capacity and access

Africa does not have enough universities to educate all Africans. According to the Africa-America Institute, only 6 percent of people are enrolled in higher education, compared to 26 percent worldwide (Africa-America Institute 2015). But the rate of higher education is growing rapidly across the continent, as enrollment has increased from 2.3 million to 5.2 million between 2000 and 2010 (ibid). Others estimate that there are now ten million enrollees (SciDev.Net 2004). Africa still lacks the resources to provide quality education to all. But this is not merely a technical or bureaucratic problem. Like many African institutions in the 1980s and 90s, universities were victims of the lost decades, and severely hampered by structural adjustment policies.

Africans have devised creative strategies to deal with the education shortage. Thousands of Africans are educated abroad, in Europe and the United States, and increasingly in Asia and the Middle East. But there are also homegrown Pan-African solutions that depend on internal migration throughout the continent.
continent, as well as the establishment of new private universities to attract a widening middle class. The rise of Christian universities is particularly apparent, many of which are attached to charismatic figures. These include schools like the Adventist Church’s Valley View University, Mensa Otabil’s Central University and Duncan William’s Dominion University in Ghana.

Leonard Wantchekon of the African School of Economics and Patrick Awuah of Ashesi extended an alternative model. Copying models of higher education in the United States, these schools rely on private funding and institutional independence, allowing them to create rules and incentives that are not hampered by the government bureaucracy. They provide specialized skills training, focusing on economics and political science and business administration, respectively. The schools have been successful at forging international partnerships, providing rigorous technical training, and placing students in long-term jobs. Ashesi forges important connections with employers to fill the continent’s workforce needs, while the African School of Economics provides essential quantitative social science training that is otherwise lacking in most parts of Africa.

Both models call into question the role of the state in higher education. As public goods like education become further privatized, new questions of access and quality emerge. Will private institutions be able to provide education to all Africans who need it? Who is left out of the selection process? Is further specialization the way forward for African universities? Will these institutions outlive their charismatic and internationally renowned founders?

Most importantly, these new models highlight the role of non-state providers of public goods (Cammett and MacLean 2014). As one of the most important goods in African societies, the provision of higher education is central to the politics of distribution across the continent. But as new research shows, the non-state provision of public services can have unintended consequences by letting governments off the hook, and institutionalizing inequality (Carter Kushner and MacLean 2015). African societies will deal with the effects of these developments in the years to come.

Nowhere are the struggles for access to quality higher education more contentious than in South Africa. But the #FeesMustFall protests also form a broader protest movement against the governing ANC’s failure to provide public goods to the majority of South Africans. The government’s lack of political accountability has led to a strong sense of democratic disillusionment and political sting, or feelings of betrayal, insult, and disrespect among ordinary citizens because of its failure to protect and provide for its population (Paller 2013).

**Competing incentives and consultancy culture**

“We have no choice but to train postgraduate students in the very institutions in which they will have to work,” Mahmood Mamdani explained in a 2011 talk. “We have no choice but to train the next generation of African scholars at home... Postgraduate education, research and institution building will have to be part of a single effort” (Mamdani 2011). Mamdani’s call for Africa-based graduate training comes at a time when many feel that the African university is in crisis.

One of the major challenges facing universities is the consultancy culture that is largely a result of neoliberal policies. These policies have severely hampered scholarship in public universities (Samoff and Carrol 2004). Students and faculty report broken academic governance structures, crumbling infrastructure, and teaching and learning failures. Most damaging is that the research process shifts from scholar-based question-driven research that has its roots in Africa, to collecting answers for international organizations whose authority comes from abroad. The researcher is reduced to a surrogate of the international funder, rather than the producer of knowledge.

Consultancy culture is particularly prevalent in public universities situated in the national capitals, at universities like Makerere in Kampala and Legon in Accra. Western bureaucrats sponsor African academics to collect data and produce reports on a variety of social, economic and political problems. Many academics became comfortable with such engagements at the expense of research and teaching. In far-flung regions, academics become ‘entrepreneuredics.’ That is, they combine their core duty of imparting knowledge with trading activities. Lecturers compulsorily sell their lecture notes to their students to make ends meet. These
activities are necessary to supplement the low income they receive from their formal academic salary.

Nonetheless, some of the best universities across the continent are recapturing past excellence. For example, the University of Ghana at Legon (UG) and Makerere University, among others, have transformed in the last five to ten years due to partnerships with international organizations, internal accountability, and strong leadership. For example, when Professor Ernest Aryeetey was inducted into office as the Vice-Chancellor of UG in 2010, he promised to make the institution a “world class” university. He emphasized that this meant a university that will not only award degrees, but one that “would produce graduates who could achieve the same degree of learning and knowledge acquisition as they would have, had they gone to university in places like Edinburgh, Newcastle, Birmingham, Manchester, Reading amongst others (Ghana Business News 2010).”

He focused on the promotion of academic excellence through enhanced teaching, learning and leadership training; the promotion of expanded and relevant research; and the overhaul of governance structure in administration. He was committed to making the University of Ghana “a research university to support the process of structural transformation in Ghana and Africa.”

This involved repositioning African scholarship by transforming the colonial agenda of public universities, which emphasized producing undergraduates at the expense of training PhDs. The new emphasis on graduate training, as well as turning public universities into research institutions, has improved graduate training in the country. Now, PhDs at UG are based on one year of course work, experiential learning, and thesis writing. A full training program for a PhD now exists, and is far more rigorous than it used to be. Similar improvements have been made at the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR).

These investments have paid off. University of Ghana has risen to the seventh best university in Africa, according to the Times Higher Education World University Rankings (Times Higher Education 2015). According to an open letter by 41 Africanist scholars, MISR has become “the leading center for postgraduate training in the social sciences in eastern Africa” (Redden 2016). Nonetheless, MISR now finds itself at the center of a deepening scandal over its management and governance, demonstrating the challenges facing institutions of higher learning on the continent today.

Decolonizing the university

Who studies Africa, and how it should be studied is a contentious subject. These concerns are at the center of the politics of knowledge production, which have a long history in the study of African political systems (MacLean Working Paper). Lauren MacLean explains how this struggle extends to two of the most important Africanist associations, CODESRIA based in Africa and the African Studies Association (ASA) based in the United States. ASA claims to represent “a diverse group of people interested in Africa and its people,” while CODESRIA represents “the social science community in Africa.” “The question of who can and should conduct research and write about Africa is far from settled,” writes MacLean. Additionally, Lungisile Ntsebeza argues that a critical reflection is needed to confront the future of African studies in the 21st century (Ntsebeza 2012).

These differences point to an important debate over how the continent should be studied. In a recent article based on a keynote address delivered to Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa fellows, Alex de Waal argues that African scholarship is “hampered by the preferences, policies and politics of the Western academy” (De Waal 2016). He goes on to suggest that the Western academic tradition prioritizes large datasets of abstract concepts over accurately generated information. Further, the academy incentivizes statistical analysis and quantitative skills over actual lived experience. Finally, “the Western experience of state formation remains the standard against which the rest of the world is indexed,” he says. For these reasons, de Waal concludes that much of academic scholarship on Africa does not uncover how societies actually function.

These debates are also taking place in the economics profession. University of Cape Town (UCT) honors student Ihsaan Bassier recently wrote that the economics curriculum of UCT needs a major overhaul if it is to be relevant to South Africans (Bassier 2016). According to him, “the economics
undergraduate curriculum is largely abstracted from South Africa’s economic crisis and reinforces an anti-poor understanding of policies.” The teaching lacks critical thinking, and does not provide the appropriate tools to students to actually understand the economic environment in which they find themselves. Grieve Chelwa adds that economics is taught devoid of any historical, social, and political context (Chelwa 2016).

The debate over who can study African political systems, how Africa should be studied, and the way that social sciences should be taught is part of a larger conversation about the post-colonial African university. The website Africa Is A Country has published numerous articles calling into question what a university ought to be for (Pramesh 2015); how to develop a post-colonial university (Chaturvedi 2015); and the importance of critical thinking in African higher education (Pillay 2014). Clearly, the struggle to “decolonize” African universities and scholarship, as well as generate knowledge that adequately reflects African societies, is a concern to scholars based inside and outside the continent.

Where do we go from here?

Even our own APSA Africa Workshop finds itself as part of this broader debate about higher education in Africa. As the program completed its eighth and final workshop, APSA now must assess how the partnership can be maintained, and what its role should be. Is APSA solely a funder and facilitator, or can it be an advocate for broader change across the continent? How can partnerships be maintained? Are there power imbalances between Africa-based scholars and those in the US?

But what is clear is that higher education in Africa cannot be examined outside its larger political and historical context. As the recent case of MISR shows, governing and improving universities is inherently political, and requires more than technocratic solutions, changes in rules and regulations, and increased funding. The #FeesMustFall protests demonstrate that higher education is integrally linked to struggles for social justice and political accountability. As is the case with all institutional change and reforms, there will be winners and losers.

STUDENT PROTESTS AND POSTAPARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGATIVE MOMENT

By Sean Jacobs

The political theorist Achille Mbembe, from the University of the Witswatersrand in Johannesburg, describes South Africa as experiencing a “negative moment.” Though protest and dissatisfaction with the terms of the “new” South Africa have been brewing for some time, there is a strong sense that the black majority is losing patience with the ruling African National Congress. The student protests, which engulfed campuses for much of 2015, while limited by its narrow base and focus, gave a glimpse of what it could look like if the black majority turned on the ANC.

South Africa’s democratic system is twenty-two years old. The ruling African National Congress (ANC), once a liberation movement, has been transformed into an ordinary political party encumbered by an election cycle mentality, and the largesse of the state. The party also presents a paradox: Dissatisfaction with it and government are at all time highs. Much of the rancor is reserved for the country’s president, Jacob Zuma (2009–), whose regime is associated with the widespread corruption of state institutions and party structures. Yet, the ANC continues to command electoral majorities nationally, and holds executive power in eight of the nine provinces. The exception is the Western Cape, governed by an opposition party, the Democratic Alliance. The ANC also controls all major metros, i.e. large cities, except for one (Cape Town, also run by the DA).

Because of the relative weakness of opposition parties, the fragmentation of the opposition landscape more generally, and the ANC’s continued national dominance, the preferred forms of political opposition are street protests, including wildcat strikes, by workers.

Protests and disruptions are not new in the “new” South Africa. But after an initial honeymoon period (which concluded with the retirement of Nelson Mandela from elected office), protests have become

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synonymous with democratic politics in South African politics.

Between 1999 and 2003, those protests took the form of either service delivery protests or more well organized “social movements.” The former were very local, often spontaneous, mostly parochial, short-lived struggles over electricity and housing evictions. The latter were more planned, media savvy, drew on the language of struggle, allied to the ANC, brought back the language of the antiapartheid struggle and asserted new constitutional rights. The movement for access to affordable AIDS drugs and treatment, led by the Treatment Action Campaign is the best example. The TAC produced what was South Africa’s first postapartheid, progressive—and crucially multiracial and national—movement outside the ANC and the trade unions, and forced concessions from the state through the court system.

By the mid to late 2000s, more sporadic, and very violent protests, characterized by retaliatory police violence became ubiquitous. Police violence against protesters were commonplace, as was the security services spying on activists.

But throughout this period, the ANC retained its legitimacy as the guarantor of the post-apartheid settlement. By this I mean the series of political, social and economic deals in which the racial inequalities of Apartheid and wealth disparities largely remain intact and which benefits whites in general. South Africa remains the most unequal country in the world with high levels of unemployment, much of it structural, disproportionately concentrated within the black labor force. At the same time, the ANC promised a better life to black South Africa. To some extent they’ve delivered on it: 45% of households now receive some form of social assistance (Holmes 2014), more children are enrolled in schools and the government has embarked on an ambitious affirmative action project, creating a black middle class numerically equal the size of the white population.

Then came the fateful events in August 2012 at Marikana, a mine owned by a British multinational in which the country’s current deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, was a non-executive board member. Police—under pressure from the mine company and the minister of police—murdered 34 striking mine workers in broad daylight. The events shocked South Africa though it, crucially, didn’t result in mass protests. The government subsequently held a public commission, which disappointingly did not hold anyone specific accountable, but its symbolism wasn’t lost on South Africans and South Africa watchers. As Dan Magaziner and I wrote on “The Atlantic” magazine’s website in 2012: Though public discourse in South Africa refuse to acknowledge this, Marikana also marked the end of South African exceptionalism (Magaziner 2012). South Africa’s problems are no longer specific to the apartheid legacy, but about more global issues of poverty and inequality, labor rights, corporate responsibility and the behavior of multinational corporations.

In subsequent national and provincial elections in 2014, the ANC retained its electoral majority, but the Economic Freedom Front (EFF), formed merely a few months earlier, gained about 6% of the national vote. Since then, the EFF has replaced the Democratic Alliance as the effective parliamentary opposition in the public’s mind. They use a mix of carnival (they dress like Chavistas), mass protests (they succeeded in getting 50,000 people to march from downtown Johannesburg to the city’s financial quarter where banks and the stock exchange is located) to disrupting parliamentary politics (getting kicked out of the chamber, shouting for President Zuma “to pay back the money” and publicly mocking his association with a wealthy business family).

The student protests are a reflection of this wider unease.

South Africa has 23 public universities, which includes some technikons since upgraded to university status. Most students in higher education institutions are black—a result of the new government’s expansion of college access. While students at historically black universities (like Tshwane University of Technology or the University of the Western Cape) had been protesting over fees and outsourcing of service jobs on campuses, it would be protests over symbols at UCT and Rhodes that would kickstart the student movement. In March, at UCT, students protested the prominence of a statue of Cecil John Rhodes, a divisive colonial figure, while at Rhodes they objected to the name of the university. Those protests morphed into demands for more diverse faculty and to “decolonize” curriculums.
By midyear, the protests linked up with trade unions opposing outsourcing on campuses, and by year-end they demanded, first, a freeze on fees increases, and simultaneously free, public higher education. In late October 2015, after students had marched to his office in the capital Pretoria, Zuma announced there would be no fee increase. The movement was distinctive for its use of social media, highlighting patriarchy and sexual abuse in black movement politics, openly questioning the hegemony of the ANC and the failure of the new South Africa to deal with racial and class inequality.

Since the end of 2015, as the essayist T.O. Molefe (who is sympathetic to the students) has noted in “World Policy Journal,” the student movements have stalled somewhat:

Revolution as becoming isn’t only about what society and individuals should become; the protesters mostly appear to have that part down pat. They want freedom, for real this time, for themselves and those like them. But there is also this perhaps most important question at the center of this principle: How do you co-exist with those whose outsized power you’ve just overthrown? (Molefe 2016).

Similarly, the insistence on horizontal forms of organization may hamstring the students: Everyone is a leader. There is no national, coordinated structure, but a series of movements and allies that draw on student groups, the youth wings of mainstream political parties and SRC’s. As a result, groups like the EFF and the even smaller PAC, a small black nationalist party that is relatively marginalized in both liberation and postapartheid politics, have made comebacks among students.

Black, racial solidarity is foregrounded in some cases (the movements at UCT and Wits University inhibit white student involvement), but obscures differences in the issues faced by students depending on where they are located in the class structure that is South Africa’s higher education system. The issues and conditions of a black student at UWC are very different from her counterpart at UCT. Similarly, the state has employed significantly more violence in its response to protests at historically black universities where there’s less media coverage and very little middle class outrage.

Then there’s the terminology. The students prefer “decolonization” to “transformation,” the latter preferred by the state and university administrations. But even then, “decolonization” remains an elusive term. It is a big catchall, encompassing symbolic politics, white supremacy, curriculum, patriarchy, demands for diverse faculty, language politics, fees and free public higher education, among others.

Currently, students on some of the elite campuses (most notably Wits, UCT and to some extent Rhodes) are embroiled in internecine battles over sexuality, gender and class.

Finally, and this is a crucial point, less we overstate the extent of this rebellion: The students represent a minority. South Africa’s labor force is characterized by low numbers of college graduates. There are only about one million students enrolled in the university sector out of a population of 54.9 million people. This raises the question of the linkages of these student movements to the larger unease in the society or to link up with causes and groups beyond campuses.

Nevertheless, the student protests coupled with the growing appeal of the EFF and the restructuring of the trade union movement (the largest union federation split) represent an interesting political moment for South Africa. Until now the most vocal opponents of the ANC government in the public sphere were middle class whites. What the student protests have achieved is perhaps point to a possible break in the ANC’s middle class black support (who up until now was solidly for the ruling party) and that, more than street protests in faraway townships, they represent a greater threat to the ANC’s hegemony and, more crucially, the party political system.

THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

By Kajsa Hallberg Adu†

In South Africa, it is the third Friday in October 2015 and an ocean of students march to the Union Buildings in Pretoria with signs in their hands saying FeesMustFall, EndOutsourcing and even FreeEducation. After a week of protests the planned

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11.5% tuition fee increases were put on hold for at least all of 2016 and protesters went back to the lecture halls (Allison 2015).

This essay seeks to contextualize the claims made by the FeesMustFall movement in South Africa by identifying and analyzing the challenges for the higher education sector on the continent, and discuss the role of the emerging private higher educational institutions (HEIs). I will use examples from my home country of Ghana to illustrate my points.

Challenges for the higher education sector

The challenges for the HE sector in Africa have been chronicled both historically and substantively (Adejunmobi 2009; Cloete & Maassen 2015; Manuh, Gariba, & Budu 2007; Mkandawire 2015; Mpinganjira 2011; Pillay 2015; World Bank 2009; Zeleza 2009). The long list of challenges according to Teferra and Altbach (2004) include access to higher education, growth of private institutions, governance and autonomy, gender discrimination, role of research, language issues, and brain drain.

Akilagpa Sawyerr, at the time Secretary General for the African Association of Universities (AAU), suggests that universities in Africa struggle with “social exclusion, as well as a loss of focus on the public purpose of universities as institutions concentrate mainly on increasing institutional incomes and producing graduates for the labor market” (2004: 1). In the same vain, Mahmood Mamdani in an often-cited article commented on the importance of research in the university and discussed as a central problem contract research or “the NGO-ization of the university” (2011).

All of these challenges merit attention, and in a way they are all interlinked. However in this short essay, I will focus on two: the low input and output of higher education. Low input as expressed in low enrollment rates and low research output. These two challenges also highlight the divide in roles between public and private HEIs.

Low enrollment rates

The so-called massification of higher education is a global phenomenon and its drivers are “democratisation of education, the advent of the knowledge economy and globalization” (Mohamedbhai 2008: vi). Cloete and Maassen, however, do not want to accept the label of “massification” to describe HE in Africa: “Nowhere on the continent is there a diversified and massified system; there are only over-crowded elite systems” (2015: 6). That is, social inclusive access to higher education has not yet been achieved. While rising enrollments give a growing number of Africans access to higher education, the population is also growing and the share of youth enrollment, especially from modest backgrounds, is not necessarily increasing.

With increased demand, the infrastructure is inadequate and the previous free education or cost-shared fee structure has been replaced with a system in which students or families of students take on the cost (Woodhall 2015). The cost sharing varies from small earmarked fees to large increases beyond the rate of unit price increases, even for-profit rates (Johnstone 2004: 14–15). Some universities introduced innovative approaches to cost-recovery, including a bakery and in-house consultancy run by Makerere University in Uganda in the mid-1980s (Mohamedbhai 2008: 22). However most of the cost of higher education has transferred from the state in the form of a public good, to personal and familial responsibilities.

In a speech in 1999, Ghana’s vice president Professor J.E.A. Mills suggested: “It has become clear that the legacy of free University attendance, that was possible three or four decades ago when the numbers were small, cannot be maintained under present circumstances” (cited in Benneh, Awumbila, & Effah 2004: 14). Hence fees have in a short space of time become the norm. Whether or not free education leads to social inclusion (Assié-Lumumba, 2006) or increased inequalities (Langa, Wangenge-Ouma, Junghlut, & Cloete 2016) is an ongoing debate. Despite the effects, the rise of fees has not resulted in widespread protest, except in South Africa.

While some HE institutions find creative ways to mitigate fee increases, including channeling philanthropic and corporate social responsibility funds, using technology, and teaching high-demand courses, a majority of private HEIs – and increasingly public universities too – require students to bear the full cost of their education. This potentially undermines the idea of education as a public good.
Low research output

The other major issue for the sector I will discuss is research output, which is extremely weak. Only 0.7% of scientific literature has an author from an African institution, and that number is down from 1% in 1987 (Tijissen 2007 cited in Bloom, Canning, Chan, & Luca 2014: 28). This can be attributed to the crisis in African higher education, including few qualified academics and unclear strategies for training new lecturers, insufficient funds for libraries and research, academics leaving to the Global North and to industry, non-profit and the private sector and comparatively high pressure on African academics to teach (Manuh et al. 2007).

More importantly, the effects of this negligible contribution to knowledge can be felt, for instance as a lack in health care services, on a daily basis as “the losses that accrue from our not being a knowledge society are gargantuan, yet hardly visible, much less acknowledged” (Taiwo 2014: 99). Furthermore, the inability of Africa’s universities to contribute to knowledge production allows the Global North to set the agenda and decide on metrics to measure and define the world (Hallberg Adu 2014). Hence, several projects seek to strengthen research.

One interesting, relatively large scale project to address the low research output is the Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA) project which consists of eight so called “flagship universities,” including the public universities of Botswana, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Eduardo Mondlante, and Ghana. These are defined as role models for research with the following goals (Cloete & Bunting 2013):

- To have a high academic rating, which would make it a world-class university or at least a leading or premier university in Africa;
- To be a centre for academic excellence;
- To engage in high quality research;
- To deliver knowledge products which will enhance national and regional development

Over a period of five years these eight flagship universities received support to strengthen research, harmonize goals and data collection. Project data suggest that such concerted efforts are helpful. However local factors such as enabling systems and targeted financial rewards also have an impact on research outcomes (Nakayiwa 2015; Tijissen 2015).

From my personal experience as a doctoral student at one of the flagship universities, University of Ghana, from 2010 to 2015, I could see the impact of this program as facilities were upgraded, PhD candidates grew in number, and the institution was reloaded with a purpose that came from a stronger focus on research. However, basic amenities such as Internet connectivity, soap in the washrooms, and chairs to sit on were still issues my colleagues and I had to overcome during our studies and which are not unimportant for a university wanting to make it to “world-class.”

Since the early 1990s, private HEIs have joined public universities in the attempt to educate African students. Private universities account for a growing share of enrollments. In 2006, the average proportion of total enrollments in private higher education was around 20%, with big variations like Cape Verde with more than 50%, and Djibouti, Tunisia, and Mauritania with less than 5%. However, in 10 years, the sector has grown substantially. The same publication projected that Africa in 2015 would have twice as many students compared to 2006, increasing from 9.3 million enrollees to 18-20 million (World Bank 2010). Most private universities on the continent are full fee paying institutions.

As an example, the higher education sector in Ghana opened up to private players in 1993 by creating a structure for accrediting private universities. By 2006 private universities enrolled 8% of all university students in Ghana. The 2007 Ghana Education Reform included a goal to increase private sector participation in education, implementing policies such as granting tax exemptions to educational institutions in efforts to spur increases in private higher education (Hallberg Adu 2009). Unfortunately, reports from quality assurance institutions are not available to see the results of the policy.

Private universities must affiliate with public universities to ensure quality, but this might not be ideal for growing and diversifying the sector. Alternative models include Kenya’s Commission for Higher Education, an independent body that regulates private higher education institutions. In Zimbabwe, public and private universities are regulated in the same way (Mabizela 2015: 20). In
South Africa, the sector was opened up to private players after 1994 and many private universities were founded. However, a few years later when a more rigorous regulation scheme was added to ensure quality and local input in curricula, many private institutions, especially foreign ones, closed shop (MacGregor 2008). Currently 21 of the countries on the continent have quality assurance institutions set up for monitoring private higher education. Quality is a major concern for the private education sector.

Another potential problem for private HEIs is foregoing diverse and resource intensive disciplines like STEM and instead “specializing in inexpensive fields of study that are high in demand” (Mabizela 2015: 21). This leads to a potential problem where these schools attain permanent non-university status.

**Bench-Marking and Creative Solutions**

A potential gain with opening the sector up to private players is diversification. The smallest private university in Ghana, Ashesi University College, has as its mission to educate “a new generation of ethical, entrepreneurial leaders for Africa.” The institution is modeled on the American liberal arts college with foundational core courses in English, Social Sciences, Math, Programming, Economics and Statistics for all students, regardless of major (Grant 2016). This is a model that greatly differs from the public universities and their traditional focus on one or two subjects.

While private universities are not often research intensive, they must not be dismissed from the research agenda and likely can do more and better research with the right leadership. In a paper to chronicle the journey from low research output to addressing the problem of low research output, Bill Buenar Puplampu of the Central University College, Ghana’s biggest private university, suggests a framework of tested interventions to build a research culture, including “leadership from dean, research seminars, Research policy, Support from the university, articulation of relevant values, Direct mentoring and coaching,” but also “structural changes” such as revising teaching schedules to allow for research to happen during the work week (2015: 23). This approach has much in common with Mamdani’s (2011) push to address the consultancy culture or “NGOification” at Makerere.

While private HEIs could be part of a solution, these institutions must be allowed – and encouraged – to innovate and challenge existing curricula, and results must be documented. The major promise of opening the sector to private players is not merely to absorb the demand for higher education, but the opportunity to diversify programs through academic debate, data sharing, and creating new benchmarks for constant improvement.

As an example, Ashesi University College collects and publishes data on employment after graduation. While extremely relevant, mechanisms for collecting such data were noted as lacking (Mohamedbhai 2008: 38). However, the National Accreditation Board of Ghana has recently taken note of alumni tracing and included such data collection in their audit and in the charter application (Grant 2016). This shows that if such data are collected and aggregated, stakeholders in the sector might be motivated to follow.

**Conclusion**

While private education spreads across the continent, the FeesMustFall movement pointed out the inherent inequality of the “pay-as-you-go” higher education system. In the face of extreme growth in demand for higher education fueled by the emergence of the knowledge society and the democratization of higher education and globalization, the challenges of low enrollment rates and low research output remain.

The promise of private higher education is to provide the necessary infrastructure to educate larger numbers of students than the limited-budget state sponsored universities in Africa otherwise could. But it does more. In addition, private universities can provide an alternative to the public institutions by setting new benchmarks and standards.

However, both of these potential promises are not adequately harnessed and sometimes hampered by overbearing administrative set-ups that render the private institutions overly dependent on the already existing public bureaucracies, or by lack of data and research efforts by the sector itself. By prioritizing intensified data collection, benchmarking, and research on the higher education sector, these hopes might be realized.
References

THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA: INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM


STUDENT PROTESTS AND POSTAPARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGATIVE MOMENT


THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN HIGHER EDUCATION


Announcements

AFRICA WORKSHOPS 8-YEAR SURVEY EVALUATION

In January 2016, APSA issued a survey to all 195 Africa Workshop alumni who had participated in the program from 2008-2015. By the end of the 4-week survey window, 39% of workshop alumni (76 respondents) had completed the survey. In advance of a more thorough report that will be released later this year, a few key results are described here:

Over 92% of alumni are in academic positions, either as university-based faculty, PhD students, or Post-doctoral fellows. However, many alumni also lend their expertise to consulting opportunities or other projects; over 25% have worked both in and outside academia since their participation in the workshop.

Africa Workshops alumni are productive scholars. Every single respondent reported some type of scholarly activity since their participation in the workshops (participated in an academic conference, received grant funding, or published a book, journal article, consultancy or white paper). Over 66% reported some type of published output (book, journal article, consultancy or white paper) related to the research they presented at the workshop.

Finally, workshop alumni remain connected to one another. Almost all alumni respondents had contact with other participants since the workshops, either regarding professional topics or keeping up social ties. Much of this communication is ongoing; 79% of Africa-based alumni and 94% of US-based alumni reported keeping in touch occasionally or frequently with other program participants. Furthermore, alumni communication is often related to professional support and research collaborations: 45% of Africa-based participants have communicated with other participants about research collaborations, 60% of US-based participants have communicated with US-based leaders about reviewing their research, and 27% of Africa-based participants have communicated with other participants to organize a workshop.

Overall, the survey points to a community of scholars who were positively impacted by their participation in the Africa Workshops program, and who remain active in their careers, closely networked with one another, and engaged in the discipline.

ALUMNI NETWORKING GRANTS

The final round of Alumni Networking Grants was held in November 2015. Made possible by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the grants program supported alumni participation in activities such as presenting at an academic conference, organizing a mini-workshop, or advancing current research towards publication. From August 2013 – November 2015 APSA awarded over $136,000 in small grants to 48 Africa Workshops alumni. Recent recipients include:

- Odette Murara (2015) – $2,000 Professional Development Grant
- Mohamed Bakari (2009), John Clark (2015), Lucy Massoi (2015), and William Walwa (2015) – $11,000 Workshop Grant
- Josiane Tousse Djou (2015) and Hassan Njifon Njoya (2015) – $3,000 Workshop Grant

Congratulations to these alumni! Additional information can be found online at http://community.apsanet.org/Africa/alumnigrants.
ALUMNI NEWS AND PUBLICATIONS

If you would like to submit an announcement to be included in future Alumni News, send your updates directly to africanewsletter@apsanet.org. Please join us in congratulating the following alumni for their continued professional accomplishments!

2008 Alumni – Dakar, Senegal

- Catherine Boone (London School of Economics and Political Science) won the 2015 APCG Award for Best Book with her book Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics (Cambridge, 2014). She also co-authored the article “Land institutions and political ethnicity in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania” in Comparative Politics 48, no. 1.
- Robin Harding (University of Oxford) published the article “Attribution and accountability: Voting for roads in Ghana” in World Politics 67, no. 4.

2009 Alumni – Accra, Ghana

- Keith Weghorst (Vanderbilt University) is the new editor of the APCG Newsletter.
- Kristin Michelitch (Vanderbilt University) and Jaimie Bleck (University of Notre Dame) co-authored the article “The 2012 crisis in Mali: Ongoing empirical state failure” in African Affairs 114, no. 457.

2010 Alumni – Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

- Alice Kang (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) published a co-authored article “Her Ladyship Chief Justice: The Rise of Female Leaders in the Judiciary in Africa” in the Winter 2015 issue of Africa Today vol. 62, no. 2. It is available open access.

2011 Alumni – Nairobi, Kenya

- Laura Thaut Vinson (Oklahoma State University) co-authored the article “Local power-sharing institutions and interreligious violence in Nigeria” in the Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 1.

2012 Alumni – Gaborone, Botswana

- Joyce Ejukonemu (Federal College of Education-Technical, Bichi) was promoted to the rank of Senior Lecturer. She also recently published her book Gender Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Widowhood Rights Among the Urhobo and Gbagyi People of Nigeria with Lambert Academic Publishing.
- Yacouba Moluh (Université Yaoundé II) was promoted to Associate Professor of Political Science.

2013 Alumni – Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

- Issouf Binaté (Université Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké) contributed an editorial “Célébrations du Mawlid en Côte d’Ivoire : nouvelle dynamique religieuse et enjeux de pouvoirs” to the autumn 2015 Sahara and West Africa Bulletin (41), published by the Société Suisse Moyen-Orient et Civilisation islamique (SSMOCI).
2014 Alumni – Maputo, Mozambique


2015 Alumni – Nairobi, Kenya

- The most recent African Politics Conference Group (APCG) Newsletter (vol. 12, no. 1) featured a Symposium on “Conflict and Political Violence: Emerging Voices from the 2015 Africa Workshop” with contributions by Jacob D. Chol (University of Juba), Lucy Massoi (Mzumbe University), Ahmed Ibrahim (CUNY), Cori Wielenga (University of Pretoria), and Tarila Marclint Ebide (University of Leuven).
- Chiedo Nwankwor (University of Delaware) successfully defended her dissertation in December 2015.
- Kathleen Klaus (Northwestern University) co-authored the article “Land grievances and the mobilization of electoral violence: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya” in the *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 5.

PHOTOS

HOT OFF THE PRESS

Gender and the Judiciary in Africa: From Obscurity to Parity?
Edited by Gretchen Bauer and Josephine Dawuni

“At last African women judges receive the careful scholarly attention they deserve. This work underscores the centrality of the third branch of government in democratization. The authors’ careful following of a common protocol allows both valuable comparisons as well as solid introductions for the country specialist and novice alike. While the authors review no simple answers to the puzzle of significant country-to-country variation, happily, they analyze how to increase women’s representation rather than replaying tired essentialist arguments about difference. Perhaps African feminists will inspire the rest of the world to demand a diverse and representative judiciary? A must read for anyone interested in comparative politics, African politics and women and politics, or judicial politics.”—Sally J. Kenney, Necomb College

Education and Empowered Citizenship in Mali
By Jaimie Bleck

“A theoretically important, methodologically rigorous, and original contribution to our understanding of education and democracy in Africa. Bleck’s insights are grounded in a deep knowledge of and engagement with politics in Mali, but are also keenly relevant for many other parts of Africa and the developing world.”—Lauren M. MacLean, Indiana University

Gender Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Widowhood Rights Among the Urhobo and Gbagyi People of Nigeria
By Joyce Ejukonemu

This book is premised on the violation of constitutional rights of widows as related to widowhood practices in Nigeria. Discriminatory widowhood practices are prevalent in some parts of Nigeria. Drawing from extensive village based fieldwork, this book examined the contradictions between the documented rights and widowhood practices and found puzzling variance in the intensity of widowhood practices among the Urhobo and Gbagyi people of Nigeria. The author asserts that widows, irrespective of tribe are faced with cultural practices and the reason widowhood practices vary is culture based. Bad widowhood practices create barriers to access to education, employment and hinder social inclusion, economic ability, and national development.